New York State Bar: “Ethics Opinion 1265: Conflicts of interest” —

• “A lawyer formerly employed by a Legal Aid Society office would not have a conflict in representing a client in a matter adverse to a party who had been represented by other lawyers in that office at that time unless the lawyer, while at Legal Aid, acquired confidential information that was material to the new matter and the matters were substantially related.”
• “The inquirer was employed by the Legal Aid Society of her county for a number of years, representing clients in Family Court. She left employment at Legal Aid and practiced in another area of the law and now is representing clients in the same Family Court in private practice (not as an employee of the Legal Aid Society). She inquires whether she has a conflict in representing clients adverse to a party that was represented in Family Court by another Legal Aid Society lawyer during the time she was employed by the Society.”
• “Does a lawyer formerly employed by the Legal Aid Society have a conflict of interest in appearing in Family Court adverse to a party who was represented by a different Legal Aid Society lawyer during the time that the inquiring lawyer was employed by the Society?”
• “Under Rule 1.9(b), a lawyer who did not herself represent a client of the Legal Aid Society would have a conflict in representing someone “materially adverse” to that former Legal Aid Society client only if the lawyer had “acquired” confidential information that was ‘material’ to the new matter and if the matters were ‘substantially related’ … But even if the matters were substantially related, if the lawyer did not acquire material confidential information about the former matter on which other Legal Aid Society lawyers worked (but on which the inquirer personally did not work), then the lawyer would have no conflict appearing adverse to the former Legal Aid Society client.

“A Defense Win in Texas on the Issue of ‘But For’ Proximate Causation in a Legal Malpractice Case” —

• “The Texas Court of Appeals held that when a plaintiff’s claim against her former attorney properly is grounded in professional negligence, the plaintiff cannot also bring a breach of fiduciary duty claim against the attorney.”
• “Further, the court ruled that a legal malpractice plaintiff must prove that her lawyer’s negligence was the proximate cause of cognizable damages and, in situations regarding contract formation, that the other contracting party would have agreed to the aPlaintiff alleged that defendant failed to exercise ordinary care and had various undisclosed conflicts of interest. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that the contracts were negligently drafted and allowed Schnur and Anderson to ‘circumvent’ or ‘cut out’ plaintiff from future deals.dditional or changed contractual terms.”
• “In June 2014, plaintiff entered into a series of contracts with Alan Schnur and David Anderson, who owned several apartment complexes for investment purposes. The series of contracts executed between plaintiff, Schnur and Anderson essentially merged their businesses and formed a new entity to solicit new investors to purchase additional properties. Plaintiff alleged that her attorney, the defendant, represented not only the plaintiff but also Schnur and Anderson during the contract negotiations and drafting.”
• “Plaintiff claimed that defendant did not draft the contracts herself but engaged another law firm to draft the contracts without plaintiff’s consent. Plaintiff also alleged that defendant had financial interests in the apartment properties. If the defendant had disclosed her conflicts, plaintiff would have hired new counsel and benefited from more favorable contract terms.”
• “Plaintiff argued that she had an attorney-client relationship with defendant, and that defendant breached her fiduciary duty by undertaking the representation ‘fraught with conflicts of interest’ and by hiring a separate law firm to draft the agreements.”
• “The court held that Forshee’s allegation that Moulton hired another law firm to draft the agreements sounded in negligence, not a breach of fiduciary duty. The court also held that simultaneous representation, without more, did not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty, noting that plaintiff failed to show that defendant obtained any improper benefit or placed her own financial interests over plaintiff’s interests.”

“Massachusetts lawyer reprimanded after accidentally copying opposing counsel email to lawyer with plan to avoid judge’s call” —

• “… the recent Massachusetts Board of Overseers Order imposing a reprimand on a lawyer who sent an email to another lawyer to evade a judge’s and accidentally copied opposing counsel.”
• “The judge stated that he wished to telephone the bankruptcy attorney from the bench, and CSI’s counsel provided the bankruptcy attorney’s phone number to the clerk.”
• “While the clerk was dialing the bankruptcy attorney’s number, the respondent took his cell phone from his pocket and sent the bankruptcy attorney an email that stated ‘Court is going to call you. Don’t pick up.’ He also sent the bankruptcy attorney a text message that stated: ‘Don’t pick up your phone.’ The bankruptcy attorney did not pick up the phone because he was occupied with another client, and not because of the respondent’s email and text.”
• “The respondent did not inform the judge that he was sending the email and text to the bankruptcy attorney. However, he inadvertently copied the email to CSI’s counsel. The next day, CSI’s counsel brought the email to the judge’s attention.”