“2 Law Firms Disqualified Over Litigation Funding” —

• “Two law firms have been disqualified from representing the defendants in a New Jersey patent dispute because they were getting funding from a nonparty. The ruling serves as a reminder of the ethical questions that can arise when litigants accept funds from nonparties who are willing to pay the bills.”
• “U.S. Magistrate Judge Andre M. Espinosa of the District of New Jersey, in Harish v, Arbit, ruled that Saiber of Florham Park, New Jersey, and Banner Witcoff of Chicago could not continue representing two inventors, because the lawyers were being funded by a nonparty producer of medical test equipment—Lincoln Diagnostics of Decatur, Illinois—which had an interest in the outcome.”
• “The case involves three people who were listed on the patent in 2018 as inventors of a device for conducting allergy skin tests without the discomfort from traditional methods using multiple injections.”
• “In 2021, Harish sued Arbit and Rubenstein, claiming he is the only inventor of the device and seeking to remove the others’ names from the patent, according to the complaint. Later, Harish moved to disqualify Saiber and Banner Witcoff from representing Arbit and Rubinstein, alleging that their bills are being paid by Lincoln. Espinosa granted the motion on Jan. 31.”
• “‘New Jersey RPC 1.8(f) outlines the circumstances where a lawyer can accept money on behalf of a client from a third party,’ said Noam J. Kritzer of Kritzer McPhee in Florham Park, New Jersey, who represents Harish. ‘If litigation is like driving a car, third-party funders are allowed to pay for gas but are not allowed to program the GPS or touch the steering wheel. Here, the attorneys at Banner Witcoff were serving Lincoln’s interests instead of defendants’ interests and the order explains in great detail the ethical violations the attorneys committed under NJ RPC 1.8(f).'”
• “The parties to the payment arrangement could not demonstrate that the client gave informed consent; and they failed to demonstrate that there was no interference with the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment or with the lawyer-client relationship, Espinosa wrote.”
• “‘Defendants present their respective declarations as evidence that the fee arrangement here has not interfered with their lawyers’ independent judgment. But this does not establish that Lincoln has not directed, regulated, or interfered with defense counsel’s professional judgment. The record makes clear that Lincoln is directing, regulating, and interfering with defense counsel’s professional judgment in its representation of defendants, and thus, the second Grand Jury condition is not satisfied,’ Espinosa wrote.”
• “Also, the parties failed to demonstrate there was no communication between the lawyer and the third-party payer concerning the substance of representation of the client, and that once the third-party payer commits to pay for the representation of another, the third-party payer shall not be relieved of its continual obligations to pay without leave of court brought on prior notice to the lawyer and the client.”
• “‘Defendants present their respective declarations as evidence that the fee arrangement here has not interfered with their lawyers’ independent judgment. But this does not establish that Lincoln has not directed, regulated, or interfered with defense counsel’s professional judgment,’ Espinosa wrote. ‘The record makes clear that Lincoln is directing, regulating, and interfering with defense counsel’s professional judgment in its representation of defendants, and thus, the second Grand Jury condition is not satisfied.'”

“New York judge resigns after saying he can’t be on a jury since he thinks all defendants are guilty” —

• “An upstate New York judge has resigned after he got out of jury duty by claiming that he couldn’t be impartial — because he thought everyone brought before a court is guilty.”
• “Richard T. Snyder, who had been a justice of the Petersburgh Town Court for about a decade, left his post after being charged with misconduct by a state judicial commission, officials said Tuesday.”
• “According to court transcripts, Snyder tried to avoid serving on a jury in 2023 by first identifying himself as a judge and then saying, ‘I know everybody come in front of me. I know they are guilty. They would not be in front of me.'”
• “He was eventually dismissed from serving on the jury after he continued to argue that he could not be impartial, saying ‘No. It would not be fair,’ court transcripts from a special grand jury empanelment in Rensselaer County show.”
• “The judge who was overseeing the jury selection reported Snyder to state officials.”
• “At a judicial commission hearing the following year, Snyder said he understood that defendants are supposed to be considered innocent until proven guilty but that he still felt that people wouldn’t be in court if they didn’t commit crimes.”
  “‘I meant, that they were guilty because they did something wrong. But they’re not guilty ‘til they come to court. They’re innocent ’til proven guilty,’ he told the commission. ‘They did something wrong. That’s why they got a ticket. But they’re not guilty,’ he added.”
• “Snyder, who was elected as a justice, is not an attorney and has agreed to never serve as a judge again.”
• “In a statement, Robert H. Tembeckjian, administrator of the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, said ‘there is no place on the bench for someone who so deeply misunderstands the role of a judge and the administration of justice.'”
• “‘It is bad enough that a judge would seek to avoid such a fundamental civic responsibility as jury service. It is astounding that the judge would claim an inability to be impartial, and to declare under oath that the accused must be guilty or they would not be in court,’ he said.”

“Philly Judge Rejects Ex-Kline & Specter Attorney’s DQ Bid” —

• “A former Kline & Specter partner can’t disqualify an attorney representing it from his lawsuit against the firm, a Philadelphia judge has determined, because he couldn’t prove he had an attorney-client relationship with the lawyer before he resigned.”
  “Terrance DeAngelo did not submit any substantial emails, agreements or related documents to show he had a privileged attorney-client relationship with Joseph R. Podraza, who advised him when he sat for a deposition in a separate case while DeAngelo was still employed by Kline & Specter, wrote Judge James C. Crumlish in an opinion published Tuesday in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. Podraza now represents Kline & Specter as defendants in DeAngelo’s breach of contract suit, but he should not be removed from the case, the judge said.”
  “Judge Crumlish issued the order denying the disqualification in December and filed the opinion this week in response to notification from DeAngelo that the decision has been appealed to the Superior Court. The opinion asks the Superior Court to affirm the denial, saying DeAngelo did not credibly show he believed he had a privileged relationship with Podraza.”
  “In a statement to Law360 Pulse Friday, Podraza said Judge Crumlish’s opinion ‘speaks volumes and requires no amplification from us.'”
  “DeAngelo’s attorney could not be reached for comment Friday.”
  “In December, Judge Crumlish also granted Kline & Specter’s motion to send the case into arbitration and stayed the proceedings in his court. DeAngelo did not appeal those orders.”
  “According to his motion filed in December seeking the disqualification, Podraza had counseled DeAngelo when he appeared in July for a deposition in a separate lawsuit filed by his friend Thomas Bosworth against Kline & Specter while DeAngelo was still employed there.”
  “DeAngelo asked for legal advice from Podraza about the influence the deposition would have on his own employment at Kline & Specter, thinking Podraza was his attorney, according to the motion. After DeAngelo submitted his resignation in September, Podraza clarified in a letter that he is the firm’s attorney and his representation of DeAngelo was limited to the deposition, the motion said. DeAngelo said in his motion that he shared information with Podraza thinking it was a privileged relationship, and Podraza should be disqualified from a case where he could appear as a material witness.”
  “In his underlying suit against Kline & Specter, DeAngelo makes several claims against it, including that it breached its contractual obligations by failing to treat him in a professional or collegial manner by removing him from cases.”
  “Judge Crumlish points to an email DeAngelo sent to Podraza and copied to Kline & Specter’s principals, Thomas R. Kline and Shanin Specter. The email said, ‘Aren’t you my lawyer? I did not receive any notice from you that you were not continuing to represent me.’ This is the only written material submitted by DeAngelo to establish he believed he had an attorney-client relationship with Podraza, the judge said.”
  “There are no other emails, transcripts from the July deposition, or signed agreements to establish such a relationship, the opinion said. Most notably, Judge Crumlish wrote, Podraza did provide any written document that he would abandon Kline & Specter as clients in order to represent DeAngelo.”
  “Additionally, if DeAngelo truly believed Podraza was his lawyer, he would have notified his attorney in advance of his plan to resign and sought advice on how to proceed, according to the opinion.”