“Judge Sanctions Barnes & Thornburg $172K as Tactics Backfire” —

• “A federal judge in Washington, D.C. has issued a $172,635 sanction against Barnes & Thornburg and two of its attorneys for filing what the court found was a meritless motion to disqualify opposing counsel.”
• “The move backfired, as the court spotlighted a slew of other missteps—including late night filings and serving more than a dozen depositions two days before opposing counsel was due to respond to Barnes & Thornburg’s motion for summary judgment. And the entire firm is liable, because its general counsel approved the litigation strategy, the judge wrote.”
• “The sanction stems from a wage-and-hour suit in federal court where the Big Law firm represents GardaWorld, a security company. Barnes & Thornburg attorneys Teresa L. Jakubowski and Adam T. Calandra leveled six ethics violations against DCWageLaw, the two-lawyer firm representing security guards in a series of suits against GardaWorld.”
• “But U.S. District Judge Beryl A. Howell rejected all six claims, finding defense counsel’s effort ‘to impugn the reputation of plaintiffs’ counsel by calling their ethics into question has boomeranged.'”
• “The sanction order found the firm and its lawyers—Jakubowski and Calandra—jointly and severally liable in the case, Chang v. United American Security.”
• “Barnes & Thornburg filed the disqualification motion just before midnight on Feb. 16, two days before DCWageLaw’s summary judgment reply was due. The same night, Barnes & Thornburg served 18 deposition subpoenas on plaintiffs and putative class members.”
• “And two days later, on the day of the summary judgment filing deadline, Calandra threatened to file the same motion in 17 other cases DCWageLaw is litigating against GardaWorld.”
• “Meanwhile, Barnes & Thornburg alleged DCWageLaw violated Rule 4.2 by making phone calls to two hourly security officers whom GardaWorld characterized as managers. It claimed that DCWageLaw created a conflict of interest under Rule 1.7 by simultaneously representing class and individual plaintiffs asserting identical claims against the same defendant.”
• “Barnes & Thornburg later moved to withdraw its disqualification motion.”
• “But at a Feb. 24 hearing Howell denied the motion to withdraw, finding that ‘the damage ha[d] been done,’ given the court’s finding that the disqualification motion had been filed ‘for tactical reasons,’ ‘to impugn the plaintiffs’ firm’s integrity and ethics,’ and ‘to chill their communications that might be appropriate with employees of defendant.'”
• “The plaintiffs moved for sanctions—reimbursement of the attorney fees they’d spent responding to the opponent’s motion.”
• “Later, on Feb. 20, Barnes & Thornburg moved to withdraw its disqualification motion upon receipt of four concessions from plaintiffs’ counsel.”
• “The judge wrote that Barnes & Thornburg lawyers demanded plaintiffs’ counsel ‘refrain from contacting individuals who are supervisors or managers of our client,’ although plaintiffs’ counsel previously established that the contacts at issue were expressly permitted under District of Columbia law; stop including confidential settlement communications in pleadings filed with the court, stop including exhibits and other information subject to protective orders in other cases, and agree that all evidence obtained from these ex parte contacts with GardaWorld’s managers or supervisors be excluded from evidence.”
• “Howell then granted DCWageLaw’s motion for sanctions, finding Barnes & Thornburg ‘unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings in these consolidated matters, warranting an order that defense counsel satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses and attorney fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.'”
• “The judge also noted the timing of the disqualification and Barnes & Thornburg’s actions thereafter demonstrate that the motion was filed ‘for tactical reasons.'”
• “Making the entire firm liable for the sanction was warranted because Barnes & Thornburg’s general counsel approved the filing of the disqualification motion, Howell said, citing a statement from Jakubowski that the disqualification motion was filed ‘in consultation with our internal general counsel’s office.'”

David Kluft asks: “If my client fires me, does that mean my access to their Dropbox files is no longer authorized?” —

• “In 2017, a NY realty company gave their outside counsel access to the company Dropbox account. The company terminated the lawyer in 2018 but didn’t change the Dropbox passwords or expressly tell the lawyer to stop accessing the Dropbox account.”
• “The lawyer accessed the DropBox account several times in 2019, including one time in December 2019 after successor counsel told the lawyer to cut it out. The company filed a claim for violation of the Stored Communications Act.”
• “On summary judgment, the court rejected the lawyer’s argument that the ‘authorization’ defense applied: ‘Once a counsel’s legal services have been terminated by a client, that counsel should not reasonably expect continued authorization to access and benefit from the former client’s electronic resources.'”
• “However, the Court found that there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the lawyer had the requisite intent for a violation of the act prior to the time he was expressly prohibited from accessing the account.”
• Decision: here.

“Minnesota Court of Appeals Holds that an Insurer’s Reservation of Rights Can Entitle an Insured to Select Independent Counsel” —

• “On June 1, 2026, the Minnesota Court of Appeals issued a decision in Fabyanske, Westra, Hart & Thomson, P.A. v. Western National Mutual Insurance Company, in which the court held that a conflict of interest on the part of counsel hired by an insurance carrier can entitle an insured to independent counsel that is paid for by the carrier. When an insurer defends an insured under a reservation of rights, and the facts to be determined in the underlying action are the same facts upon which coverage depends, the court concluded the insurer’s duty to defend transforms into a duty to reimburse the insured for reasonable attorney fees incurred in defending the lawsuit.”
• “After roughly a year of litigation, the general contractor hired the law firm Fabyanske, Westra, Hart & Thomson, P.A. (Fabyanske) to review its coverage under the subcontractor’s policy. Fabyanske subsequently informed Western that the general contractor objected to the reservation of rights and asserted that such a reservation created a conflict of interest which provided the general contractor with a right to independent counsel.”
• “The conflict of interest arose because Western agreed to defend the general contractor unless and until the general contractor was found to be negligent. Therefore, Fabyanske argued Western would benefit from the general contractor being found negligent because Western could then deny coverage. Western refused to withdraw its reservation of rights and denied the existence of any conflict. The general contractor continued to work with both Fabyanske and its carrier-hired counsel to defend the case.”
• “After the underlying action settled, Fabyanske sent Western an invoice for its fees, Western refused to pay, and Fabayanske sued Western for failure to pay. The district court granted Western’s summary judgment motion, finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether a conflict of interest existed. Fabyanske appealed.”
• “The court of appeals explained that general liability insurers have a duty to defend insureds when any part of the claim is arguably within the scope of coverage. And when coverage is questioned, insurers must inform the insured of that question and issue a reservation of rights. Yet that reservation itself can create a conflict of interest between the insurer and the insured. In such a circumstance, ‘the insurer’s duty to defend transforms into a duty to reimburse’ and the insured has the right to select independent counsel.”
• “The court of appeals noted that (1) the general contractor tendered its defense to Western, (2) Western agreed to defend the general contractor subject to the reservation of rights that stated Western would not cover the general contractor for their own negligence, and (3) therefore, the same facts upon which Western was able to deny coverage—the general contractor’s negligence—would be decided in the underlying action. Thus, the court of appeals determined that a conflict existed between Western and the general contractor that transformed Western’s duty to defend into a duty to reimburse.”
• “Drawing from these precedents, the court of appeals held that a conflict of interest entitling an insured to independent counsel exists when (1) the insurer defends under a reservation of rights and (2) the facts to be determined in the underlying action are the same facts upon which coverage depends.”
• “This decision provides clarity for insureds and insurers and has important implications regarding the right to independent counsel.”