Bressler Risk Blog

“Why All Lawyers (Even Solos) Need to Take Deepfakes Seriously – and What You Can Do About Them” —

• “Let’s start by defining the word deepfake. A deepfake is a hyper-realistic image, video, or audio forgery that was edited or generated using artificial intelligence. These synthetic media can convincingly mimic real people saying or doing things they never did; can portray events, people, or things that are not real; and are difficult if not impossible for humans to reliably distinguish from the real thing.”
• “Making matters worse, deepfake technology is rapidly advancing; is widely available to the masses; and with tools like Synthesia, DeepFaceLab, and Resemble AI, it’s easy for bad actors to fabricate content with minimal technical skill.”
• “Given the above, the implications are profound. The concerns that come immediately to mind include evidence tampering, social engineering scams, impersonation, reputational attacks, and malpractice exposure.”
• “Reputational Attacks – What if an opposing party in a contested divorce were to create a deepfake of you making racist remarks, touching someone in an inappropriate way, or threatening someone and the video goes viral? Your reputation that took years to build could be gone in an instant. You and I both know that attacks on reputations have been going on for years. Deepfakes just make the chances of this type of attack succeeding a heck of a lot better.”
• “Malpractice Exposure – What if you fail to recognize or challenge evidence that was not authentic? What if you rely on synthetic media without proper verification and it turns out the media is a deepfake? What if deepfakes are used in a disinformation or defamation campaign against a client and you fail to properly advise the client on how to respond? Missteps like these can all too easily lead to disciplinary complaints and malpractice claims.”
• “Mandate the use of an out-of-band communication process to verify the legitimacy of every request to transfer funds, regardless of who the person making the request is and the communication channel the requestor is using. To clarify, an out-of-band communication is a method of challenge and response to the requestor of a transfer, payment, or delivery of funds using a communication method that is separate and distinct from the communication method the requestor originally used. For example, if the instructions come in the form of a video call, you might try to verify the veracity of the instructions by seeking to confirm them via a text message or phone call using a previously verified number.”
• “Include a Digital Evidence Integrity and Deepfake Risk Provision in Your Engagement Agreements – Clients may not realize how costly or complex it can be to prove what is real and what is not. Given that the authenticity of digital evidence is increasingly under threat, a provision such as this can help protect clients from surprise costs, prepare them for possible attacks on their credibility, and help ensure that their own evidence can withstand scrutiny. I had Microsoft’s Copilot draft the following sample provision:”
  “Client Acknowledgment of Digital Manipulation Risks:”
  • “Client understands and acknowledges that advances in artificial intelligence and digital editing technologies—including but not limited to ‘deepfake’ audio, video, and image generation—pose a growing risk to the authenticity and reliability of electronically stored information (ESI) and multimedia evidence. These technologies may be used to fabricate or alter content in ways that are difficult to detect without expert analysis.”
  • “Preservation and Authentication of Client Evidence: To safeguard against potential challenges to the integrity of Client’s own evidence, Client agrees to cooperate in preserving original files, metadata, and chain-of-custody documentation for any digital materials relevant to the matter. Upon request, the Firm may recommend or engage forensic professionals to assist in authenticating Client-provided evidence. The cost of such services shall be borne by the Client unless otherwise agreed in writing.”
  • “Responding to Potentially Manipulated Evidence from Opposing Parties: If the Firm reasonably suspects that evidence submitted by an opposing party has been digitally manipulated or generated using deepfake technologies, the Firm may advise Client on the feasibility and cost of challenging such evidence. This may include retaining forensic experts, conducting authenticity analyses, and filing appropriate motions. Client understands that these efforts may involve significant time and expense, which are not included in standard engagement fees.”
  • “Limitation of Firm Responsibility: “While the Firm will exercise reasonable diligence in evaluating the authenticity of evidence, it cannot guarantee the detection of all forms of manipulation or fabrication. The Firm’s role does not include forensic analysis unless expressly agreed upon in a separate writing.”

ABA Formal Opinion 519: “Disclosure of Information Relating to the Representation in a Motion to Withdraw From a Representation” —

• “When moving to withdraw from a representation, a lawyer’s disclosure to the tribunal is limited by the duty of confidentiality established by Rule 1.6(a) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Unless an explicit exception to the duty of confidentiality applies or the client provides informed consent, the lawyer may not reveal ‘information relating to the representation’ in support of a withdrawal motion.”
• “Disclosure of information relating to the representation is not “impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation” under Rule 1.6(a) or otherwise impliedly authorized even when Rule 1.16(a) requires the lawyer to seek to withdraw.”
• “If disclosure is permitted by an exception to the duty of confidentiality, such as when disclosure is required by a court order, it must be strictly limited to the extent reasonably necessary and, whenever possible, made through measures that protect confidentiality such as by making submissions in camera or under seal.”

“More Than Legal Fees: The True Price Of An Ethics Investigation For Lawyers” —

• “Attorneys who find themselves in the crosshairs of an ethics investigation or disciplinary proceeding face significant costs. When a lawyer receives a bar complaint, they typically focus on what it will cost to pay an attorney to represent them. But the true price of an ethics investigation involves much more than just lawyer fees. Lawyers faced with an ethics complaint need to be mindful of the full extent of costs to which they are potentially exposed.”
• “An attorney who must hire another attorney naturally will focus on their attorney’s fees and expenses. Depending on the gravity of the situation, those outside lawyer expenses may be substantial. Moreover, the fees for representation in defending a bar complaint may, or may not be, covered by insurance—provided the lawyer has any (many do not, and most jurisdictions do not require lawyers to be insured).”
• “Some malpractice insurers provide coverage for disciplinary defense counsel. However, those policies normally limit such coverage. Typical policies provide indemnity in the range of $10,000-$50,000. Depending upon the seriousness, complexity, and duration of the matter, those limits of coverage may not be nearly sufficient–although it certainly can help.”
• “Lost Opportunity Costs. While many ethics investigations are conducted in secret and thus are not generally publicly available, the lawyer may still be obligated to inform others who have a right, or need, to know. That disclosure, in turn, can cost a lawyer substantial opportunities.”
• “If the practitioner is looking into a lateral move, they will likely be required to disclose a pending bar investigation or disciplinary proceeding to prospective employers. Good luck with that. Until the ethics matter is finally concluded, a lawyer may find it very difficult to change career paths or find new work opportunities. “
• “If the targeted practitioner holds another professional license, such as a professional engineering , securities broker, or real estate license, they may be required to disclose the ethics matter to their other licensing bodies. That may result in an adverse impact on other licenses until the ethics investigation fully plays out. “
• “Time Costs. Lawyers have an affirmative duty to cooperate with ethics investigation and cannot simply ignore the process. Those investigations can require the lawyer to divert time they might otherwise spent on more productive or pleasant activities into dealing with the investigation.”
• “The time commitment may be substantial–particularly if disciplinary counsel files a formal complaint seeking to publicly sanction the lawyer. Especially if the lawyer has a busy practice, any time they must spend on their ethics case could affect how much time they have to work on billable work or client development.”
• “Health and Wellness Costs. Turns out that being a respondent in a bar investigation, against a deeply-pocketed adversary, in a secret forum, in which your ability to earn a living is on the line, can mess with your head–literally. Fight-or-flight kicks in. Fear, anxiety, depression, self-blame, and anger are all common responses to the lawyer disciplinary process.”
• “Bar investigations can trigger mental health issues, which in turn can trigger, or exacerbate, physical health issues. Stress kills. The whole process can literally make a lawyer sick.”
• “Add to this the fact that a significant percentage of attorneys already suffer from mental health or addiction issues. Studies confirm that members of the legal profession are much more likely to have a mental health or addiction issue than members of other professions.”
• “Bad Settlement Costs.”USPTO and other state or federal bar investigations and disciplinary proceedings are marathons, not sprints. Practitioners who find themselves sucked into one must prepare for a long game. And many practitioners reach a point where they just cannot take it anymore.”
• “When settling, the lawyer who is tapped out is not engaging in an arms-length negotiation. They are not compromising. They are capitulating. When they do, they may agree to terms of settlement that are unfavorable, unreasonable, unwarranted, untrue, and downright unfair. Bar settlements are the product of grossly disproportionate bargaining power.”
• “Ethics cases are physically, mentally, financially, and emotionally draining ordeals. They are a lawyer’s worst nightmare.”

“Palantir Investor Says Williams & Connolly’s Conflict of Interest Cost Him $1B in Stock Proceeds” —

• “Investor Marc Abramowitz filed a malpractice suit against Williams & Connolly in District of Columbia Superior Court on Sunday, accusing the firm of advancing its own financial interests rather than securing the best results and settlements for Abramowitz in his years-long dispute with technology company Palantir.”
• “Abramowitz, an early investor in Palantir, claims that the elite litigation firm engaged in a conflict of interest while representing Abramowitz against Palantir, specifically by amending its fee agreement with Abramowitz in one case to allow the firm to take a 15 to 20% stake in any sale of his Palantir stock, depending on if the case was settled before trial.”
• ‘The new compensation structure…created egregiously illegal and nonwaivable conflicts of interest for Williams & Connolly, which gave the firm incentives to improperly advise Abramowitz, negligently or intentionally, to sell his Palantir stock and to settle the Palantir litigation, all in a manner benefitting the firm but causing plaintiffs massive damages,’ the suit, filed by Charles Remus III of Remus, Weddle & Cavenee, alleges.”
• “According to the suit, Abramowitz first hired Williams & Connolly to represent him in 2016 after his first attempted sale of his Palantir stock to a Chinese asset management firm, CDH Investments, fell through. In that attempted transaction, Abramowitz aimed to sell his shares for between $9.25 and $11 per share for a total of $64 million; however, the suit says, Palantir instead reached out to CDH Investments directly and convinced the company to buy shares directly from Palantir instead of Abramowitz.”
• “After Abramowitz’s sale fell through, the sale price of Palantir’s stock fell and, according to the malpractice suit, left Abramowitz unable to secure a comparable deal for his shares. Abramowitz hired Williams & Connolly in 2016, and the firm first filed a books-and-records action in Delaware in March 2017 against Palantir which was summarily dismissed by the Delaware Chancery Court.”
• “After the records action, the malpractice suit says, Williams & Connolly filed a tortious interference claim against Palantir in December 2017. The dispute between Abramowitz and Palantir continued as Palantir later filed an action against Abramowitz in Germany in 2018.”
• “In July 2019, the malpractice suit claims, Williams & Connolly amended its fee agreement with Abramowitz in only the tortious interference case, laying claim to a contingent percentage of any recovery in that case as well as a 15 to 20% stake in any sale of Abramowitz’s Palantir stock. That stake was capped at ‘three times the amount of the firm’s time charges on the tortious interference case,’ according to the suit, adding that the firm also ‘dramatically increased the hourly rates it charged’ Abramowitz at the same time, although Abramowitz did not discover this for a year after the firm failed to send invoices for its services.”
• “Under the new fee agreement, the suit claims, the firm had a financial interest in convincing Abramowitz to sell his Palantir shares for less than $10 per share in order to maximize the firm’s total payment in the tortious interference case. If Abramowitz’s shares sold for more than $10 each, the suit says, he would have had no recoverable damages in the tortious interference case and could abandon the action.”
• “In fact, the suit alleges, Williams & Connolly advised Abramowitz to sell his Palantir shares in August 2020, just before the company was slated to go public. The suit alleges the firm advised Abramowitz of this to ensure that the stock sold for less than $10 each; as such, Abramowitz sold his stock for $6 per share, or a total of $33 million, the suit says, estimating based on Palantir’s November 2025 peak stock price of $207 per share that the 2020 sale cost Abramowitz more than $1 billion.”
• ‘The Engagement Letter Amendment incentivized the Firm to convince Abramowitz to sell his shares below $10 dollars so that the Firm could (i) lock in Abramowitz’s damages, thereby eliminating any chance of Abramowitz dropping the case and guaranteeing both the Firm’s ability to increase the cap and its chance to recover a contingency fee, and (ii) immediately collect a multimillion-dollar bonus rather than face the uncertainty of payment if Abramowitz were to hold the stock well into the future,’ the suit claims.”
• “In yet another conflict of interest, the suit claims, the new fee agreement also incentivized Williams & Connolly to settle the tortious interference case without settling any of the other cases filed against Abramowitz by Palantir, which the firm continued to work on under an hourly fee-arrangement.”
• “‘Settling only the Tortious Interference Case enabled Williams & Connolly both to maximize its contingency fee—because a global settlement in which Palantir’s cases against him were also settled would have resulted in a lower monetary recovery for Abramowitz—and to bill Abramowitz for another $3.2 million in fees over the next five months’ before settling a second case, along with other pieces of litigation, in 2022, the suit claims. ‘In response to Abramowitz’s repeated inquiries about a global settlement, the Firm told him it was ‘too difficult’ and that the legal team was ‘too tired’.'”
• “After the settlement in 2022, the suit claims, Williams & Connolly requested a $3 million retainer from Abramowitz for additional work in an upcoming trial against Palantir, threatening to drop Abramowitz as a client.”
• “In total, Williams & Connolly’s representation of Abramowitz spanned six years and eight separate lawsuits involving Palantir spread across a number of state and district courts, as well as the case in Germany. The malpractice suit alleges other separate incidents of malpractice throughout the course of the representation, including an allegation that partner Barry Simon fell asleep while participating in a hearing via telephone in the German case, which was subsequently referred for criminal review for attempted litigation fraud.”
• “The suit ultimately accuses Williams & Connolly with legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty, and seeks compensatory damages, disgorgement of attorneys’ fees paid to Williams & Connolly, attorneys’ fees and costs, and pre- and post-judgment interest.”

“Suit Alleges King & Spalding Coerced Ex-Client Into Lit Funding Agreement Amid ‘Massive Overbilling’” —

• “A Chicago business owner is alleging that King & Spalding and several of its lawyers overbilled him and later pressured him to borrow from a litigation funding firm, leading to $4 million in alleged damages.”
• “David Pisor and PSIX LLC, in a lawsuit filed Friday in Illinois state court on Friday, claim he received ‘fraudulent entries, duplicative entries, and entries unrelated to Pisor’s representation.’ Pisor said the firm tied its fee structure to the litigation funder, ‘inflating their hourly rates midstream.'”
• “‘Even though it never went to trial, KS and its partners turned Pisor’s matter into a ‘full-employment-act’ for defendant KS’ Chicago office—32 individuals inefficiently handled Pisor’s matter, often duplicating, triplicating and quadrupling the same work,’ claims the lawsuit, which alleges legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty.”
• “Pisor’s lawsuit also alleges that an entity named ‘Defendant SC220163,’ affiliated with litigation funding firm Statera Capital Funding, violated the Illinois Consumer Legal Funding Act.”
• “Representatives at King & Spalding and Statera did not immediately return messages seeking comment on Monday.”
• “Pisor alleges King & Spalding engaged in overbilling through improper timekeeping practices, failed to conduct adequate due diligence and facilitated predatory litigation funding.”
• “‘This action arises out of a culture of greed and a pattern of unlawful activities at defendant KS,’ the suit stated. ‘Pisor retained the firm to protect a business he built from the ground up—valued at over $130 million—but was instead stripped of control, liquidity and clarity through a calculated orchestration of dependency, manipulation and concealment.'”
• “It stated the firm ‘failed to exercise reasonable care in their representation,’ and ‘negligently handled Pisor’s legal needs, engaged in massive overbilling and mismanagement.'”
• “‘But, worst of all, when Pisor was unable to fully pay defendants’ unconscionable fee invoices, defendants coerced Pisor into a statutorily unlawful pre-forward paid litigation funding arrangement solely for defendants’ benefit,’ Pisor’s suit stated.”
• “The suit stems from a 2015 deal between Pisor and former business partner Jim Lasky. After they co-founded Maple & Ash restaurant in Chicago’s historic Gold Coast neighborhood, its success led to the partners establishing a company that launched other restaurant ventures in Chicago, Phoenix and Los Angeles. However, a rift over finances between the partners led Pisor in 2022 to hire King & Spalding and its lawyers named as defendants in the suit, including partners Lazar Raynal, Thomas Ahlering, Mary Liz Brady, Jake Downing and Jonathan Talansky; former partners Thomas E.’Ted’ Keim Jr. and Jade Lambert Routson; and former associate Matthew J. Dixon.”
• “Eight partners, 10 associates, three counsel, seven paralegals and two litigation support members recorded about 3,000 billable hours and charged more than $3.55 million in legal fees over 11 months, Pisor said in the suit, noting the invoices ‘demonstrate the use of partner-level attorneys to do the work of paralegals and associates.'”
• “Pisor ultimately obtained litigation financing through Statera Capital Financing, doing business as ‘Defendant SC220163,’ and the financing ‘imposed significant fees on plaintiff,’ the suit stated. The financing arrangements ‘primarily benefited defendant’s financial interests,’ violated its ethical and professional duties, and created a direct conflict of interest in violation of Rule 1.8 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, it stated.”
• “‘King & Spalding directed Pisor toward litigation financing—then tied their fee structure to it, inflating their hourly rates midstream,’ the suit stated.”

“Former Home Depot attorney can’t help sue it” —

• “A federal court in California granted Home Depot’s motion to disqualify an attorney and law firm as counsel of record for the customer who is suing the retail giant over an injury; the skid-steer loader he rented pitched forward and his seatbelt failed, so he hit his head against the vehicle.”
• “The attorney used to represent Home Depot in personal injury lawsuits, and she was privy to confidential information in a case similar to the current one.”
• Decision: here.

“Counselling Two Clients in the Same Matter: Trump/Blanche” —

• “President Donald Trump, obviously expecting loyalty—actually, obeisance—appointed several of his personal attorneys to high Justice Department positions… And, directly pertinent here, Todd Blanche, his former chief criminal attorney as Deputy Attorney General at the Justice Department. There can be little doubt as to why Trump would choose them for these particular roles.”
• “Blanche, however, holds the second highest Justice Department position and has presided over the Jeffrey Epstein investigation after serving as Trump’s criminal attorney in private practice. He, therefore, is the single Trump former attorney who has literally been presented directly with a direct conflict. That is, he has (undoubtedly) conferred with Trump about the Jeffrey Epstein matter as Trump’s private lawyer. And he has been the attorney responsible for the Epstein investigation on behalf of the Justice Department in which he, oddly, interviewed Ghislaine Maxwell.”
• “That said, Blanche’s relationship with Trump has been extremely unique. In private practice, Donald Trump was literally Blanche’s only client. And even if Trump hadn’t been Blanche’s only client, Blanche would have had a duty of undivided loyalty to him—a duty that would surely exist in futuro. Blanche would be required to demonstrate that ‘loyalty’—i.e., maintain any confidences that Mr. Trump had imparted to him, even after his representation of Mr. Trump as a private citizen was long ended—and particularly when later serving in a governmental capacity.”
• “So, where would Blanche stand concerning his attorney-client responsibilities if, during the Trump presidency, Trump, as one might easily suspect, has continued to confidentially discuss with the Deputy Attorney General conduct that Trump initially revealed to Blanche pre-presidency—say, for example, about any relationship he may have had with Jeffrey Epstein?”
• “Stated otherwise, suppose the president wants, now, to discuss with Blanche a personal subject unrelated to his presidency, what ethical obligation does Blanche have either to citizen (or president) Trump to alert him to the possible perils of discussing it with him? Meaning, the potential danger of Blanche being later compelled to disclose the confidence, inasmuch as Blanche cannot technically act in the capacity of citizen Trump’s lawyer any longer.”
• “Simply put, it would clearly be improper for Blanche to talk substantively about it to Trump while he, as the Justice Department’s lead attorney, is conducting a formal government investigation that potentially involves Trump’s prior conduct. However, if Blanche chose to do so (especially inasmuch as Trump, a layman, not truly knowledgeable about privilege restrictions), what would Blanche’s obligations be? At the very least, wouldn’t Blanche be obligated to give Trump so-called Upjohn Warnings?”
• “And what does that mean? Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U. S. 383 (1981) an Upjohn Warning is a statement that a corporate counsel (here, Blanche, as an attorney for the United States), would give to the employee of the ‘corporation’ (here, the president)—clarifying that the attorney-client privilege belongs to the company, not to the individual employee. It ensures that the employee understands that his statements can actually be disclosed to the company and potentially to third parties even without the employee’s consent.”
• “It basically tells the employee (here, Trump), that (1) the attorney represents the company, not the employee; (2) the attorney-client privilege belongs to the company, not the employee; (3) the company can waive the privilege and disclose the employee’s statements to others without the employee’s consent; and (4) that the employee may wish to seek other counsel.”
• “Now, given Trump’s inordinately close relationship with the Justice Department—and here, in particular, given that Mr Blanche was Trump’s single-client criminal lawyer—it seems highly unlikely that Blanche would even consider the rigamarole of Upjohn Warnings if Trump were on the verge of imparting his concerns about Epstein when and if the heat got hot.”
• “One would certainly have wanted to be a fly on the wall when/if Trump proposed talking to Deputy Attorney General Blanche about his relationship with Jeffrey Epstein. One might imagine that Blanche would have discouraged any such conversation. But, as we know, Trump doesn’t typically take ‘no’ for an answer lightly (and likely wouldn’t be especially concerned if Blanche even urgently tried to describe his ethical obligations when encouraging the President to simply keep his mouth shut).”
• “We may never know whether Trump himself demanded that Blanche himself conduct the infamous Ghislaine Maxwell interview in which she basically ‘acquitted’ Trump of any wrongdoing relating to Epstein. Either way, it’s hard to believe that Blanche conducted that interview without having in advance heard directly from Trump his side of the Epstein/Trump story (and, by the way, from Maxwell’s lawyer exactly what she would say, and wouldn’t say, about the President’s conduct when questioned).”
• “That said, what words of comfort—or were any really necessary?—did the ‘all in’ Blanche give Trump to make him comfortable that anything he told Blanche would remain confidential? We’ll probably have to wait for Trump’s book for at least his version. At bottom, can one possibly imagine a greater conflict than that which confronted Blanche—agreeing to head a spectacular government investigation focused in part on the president, after having separately represented him as an individual?”

“Abu Dhabi Fund Blocks $800 Million Private-Equity Asset Shuffle” —

• “A Houston-based private equity firm was stopped in its tracks when an investor cried foul as it tried to sell one of its assets to itself, one of the first times such a dispute has spilled into public view.”
• “Energy & Minerals Group had already lined up investors for a continuation fund of at least $800 million when Abu Dhabi Investment Council sued over the maneuver and halted the process, according to people with knowledge of the matter.”
• “The sovereign wealth fund — an independently run unit of Mubadala Investment Co. — last week sued to stop the private equity firm from shuffling natural gas producer Ascent Resources LLC into a different vehicle, court papers show.”
• “The fight is a rare public rebuke in the the world of private equity, where investor disputes are more often cordial and private. But as buyout shops increasingly turn to offbeat maneuvers like continuation funds to return capital, investor frustration is growing. Middle Eastern allocators in particular are becoming unhappy with some of the tactics used to prolong asset sales or delay distributions.”
• “The continuation fund would have allowed some Energy & Minerals Group investors to cash out of their stakes in Ascent Resources while bringing fresh money in. But ADIC’s lawsuit alleges the process was tainted by conflicts of interest and governance missteps.”
• “‘Defendants have made multiple material misstatements and omissions about the proposed transaction and employed a variety of coercive tactics,’ lawyers for ADIC wrote in court papers. ‘In so doing, EMG has placed its own self-interest above the interests of its investors,’ they added.”
• “Energy & Minerals Group has backed Ascent, the biggest natural gas producer in Ohio, for more than a decade. It has invested in the company through at least two funds along with a secondary fund it established in 2017, filings show.”
• “The continuation fund would have seen Energy & Minerals Group take a bigger stake in Ascent at a depressed valuation, lawyers for ADIC allege. The private equity firm dismissed exit alternatives like an initial public offering or a merger without fully exploring them, they argue.”
• “The case is Abu Dhabi Investment Council Company PJSC et. al. v. The Energy and Minerals Group, 25-1389, Delaware Chancery Court (Wilmington).”

“Musk wins fight to keep lawyer Alex Spiro in Twitter trial” —

• “Elon Musk has persuaded a judge that his longtime [Quinn Emanuel] lawyer Alex Spiro can represent him in a shareholder lawsuit over the billionaire’s 2022 Twitter acquisition even though he may be a trial witness in the case.”
• “San Francisco-based U.S. District Judge Charles Breyer in a ruling on Monday rejected the plaintiffs’ objections that allowing Spiro to act as both advocate and witness would confuse jurors. The shareholders had argued that Spiro was ‘at the epicenter of virtually every important decision’ during Musk’s pursuit of Twitter and later efforts to walk away from the deal.”
• “Musk’s interest in keeping his chosen counsel, Breyer said, weighed against disqualification.”
• “The lawsuit claims Musk used misleading social media posts to drive down Twitter’s stock price to escape his $44 billion deal or negotiate a lower price for the platform, now renamed X. Musk has denied any wrongdoing.”
• “Musk’s lawyers called the effort to disqualify Spiro a ‘Hail Mary’ before a February 2026 trial, saying the investors waited too long to object to Spiro’s role. Musk on Tuesday asked the court to push the trial back until March. His lawyers said Musk ‘has a highly confidential and personal pre-existing and immovable commitment’ in late February that will not allow him to attend the trial and testify. The filing said the undisclosed matter was ‘sensitive’ and can’t be disclosed publicly.”
• “The judge said Musk gave written consent for Spiro to serve as both attorney and witness and concluded that the plaintiffs failed to show how his dual role would harm them.”
• “Breyer called concerns about jury confusion ‘generic’ and said courts can manage risks with instructions and limits on questioning. He noted that other witnesses could cover most of the topics plaintiffs identified and questioned whether Spiro’s testimony was ‘genuinely needed.'”
• “Spiro, with hourly rates of at least $3,000, has represented Musk in many cases and counts actor Alec Baldwin and New York Mayor Eric Adams among his other clients.”

“Google Challenges Motion to Disqualify Judge Over Friendship in Ongoing Antitrust Litigation” —

• “Google is contesting Unlockd Media’s motion to disqualify U.S. District Judge Haywood S. Gilliam Jr. from presiding over an antitrust lawsuit in the Northern District of California. Unlockd’s request is based on Judge Gilliam’s friendship with Cassandra Knight, Google’s Vice President for Litigation and Discovery.”
• “Google argues that this relationship does not necessitate recusal, emphasizing that Knight has not participated in the case and that mere friendship between a judge and a lawyer does not require disqualification.”
• “Unlockd filed its lawsuit in September 2021, alleging that Google’s actions, including banning the company from its app store and AdMob, led to its demise. Judge Gilliam dismissed Unlockd’s case in February 2025, deeming it based on ‘unsupported conclusions.'”
• “In a related matter, Rumble, a video-sharing platform, has also sought Judge Gilliam’s recusal in its antitrust case against Google, citing the same relationship with Knight. Google has opposed this motion as well, maintaining that the friendship does not warrant disqualification.”

“‘Our Colleague Has Been Vindicated’: Court Won’t Remove Lawyer From Case” —

• “The Texas First Court of Appeals rejected an attempt to disqualify Ahmad, Zavitsanos & Mensing from representing Transocean and other defendants in consolidated Hurricane Zeta litigation, finding that plaintiffs failed to establish a disqualifying conflict of interest.”
• “The two-page opinion allows Houston-based AZA to continue defending Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling Inc., Triton Voyager Asset Leasing GmbH, and Triton Voyager Asset Leasing GmbH in litigation involving crew member injuries aboard the Deepwater Asgard drilling rig during the October 2020 storm.”
• “The 23 plaintiffs claimed AZA attorney Karina Sanchez-Perlata created a conflict of interest because she previously worked on a case involving Dr. Henry Small, one of the treating physicians in the litigation. She previously worked as a law clerk at Arnold Itkin, the firm representing plaintiffs. The plaintiffs claimed Sanchez-Perlata had access to confidential information about Dr. Small after she joined AZA, and that she could use it against them.”
• “But the appellate court didn’t agree. ‘Any pending motions are dismissed as moot. We lift the stay of trial court proceedings,’ according to the opinion by the three-judge panel, which consisted of Justices Amparo ‘Amy’ Guerra, Kristin Guiney and Andrew Johnson.”
• “The opinion affirmed the trial court’s ruling from December 2024, in which it denied the motion to remove AZA because the Judge wrote, ‘Plaintiffs had failed to show a ‘substantial relationship’ between the prior representation and this litigation, as well as prejudice.'”
• ‘Today’s ruling not only speaks to the merits of the underlying allegations but also to the strategy deployed to attack a former summer associate,’ said Shahmeer Halepota, co-lead attorney on the case with AZA Law. ‘We are thrilled that our colleague has been vindicated.'”

“OLPR seeks discipline of lawyer in conflict-of-interest case” —

• “The Minnesota Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility has announced it is seeking discipline of attorney John Richards III for providing representation for both a man accused of felony criminal sexual conduct and the mother of the alleged victim.”
• “Richards was retained to defend A.T. on felony charges of alleged criminal sexual conduct. The alleged victim was A.T.’s minor stepdaughter, K.L., who alleged that A.T. abused her repeatedly in their home.”
• “Richards also gave legal advice to J.T., mother of K.L. and A.T.’s wife, about K.L. Specifically, he provided guidance about the girl’s participation in interviews about the alleged abuse.”
• “The OLPR petition states that ‘the interests of the alleged perpetrator and the alleged victim were directly adverse.’ This became clearer as the matter unfolded. Richards also did not ask for or obtain informed consent regarding this conflict.”
• “J.T. was contacted by law enforcement regarding the investigation in her daughter’s allegations. She contacted Richards, who told her not to speak to anyone about her husband’s alleged conduct or allow her daughter to speak about it without Richards’ approval.”
• “The daughter was scheduled for a forensic protocol interview. Richards told the mother to not allow her daughter to talk to anyone unless the person wanting to schedule the interview contacted Richards first.”
• “The mother subsequently refused to allow her daughter to attend the interview. She informed law enforcement and social services that Richards was the ‘family attorney.’ Police informed the mother that Richards could not represent her daughter due to a conflict of interest. Ultimately, J.T. agreed to the interview.”
• “‘While the forensic protocol interview could further K.L.’s (and therefore J.T.’s as her caregiver) interest in obtaining support services, the interview could also lead to the disclosure of facts damaging to the step-father’s interest in defending against K.L.’s allegations,’ the petition asserts.”
• “Richards is accused of violating Rules 1.7(a)(1), 1.7(a)(2), 1.5(b)(1), 1.15(c)(5), 3.3(a)(1), 3.4(d), 4.4(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d). “

David Kluft writes: “Can multiple prospective clients bring a class action against ambulance chasers for illegal solicitation?” —

• “After a minor car accident, a TX woman received an unsolicited phone call from a “case runner” who claimed he got her contact information from her insurer, and who offered her $10K to ‘sign up’ for legal representation with a particular law firm.”
• “The woman later alleged that this call violated the Texas barratry law and Texas ethics Rule 7.03 (prohibition on solicitation). She filed a putative class action against the firm on behalf of ‘all Texas citizens whose vehicles were involved in motor vehicle crashes and were subsequently contacted by [the firm]’ during a certain date range.”
• “However, the Court dismissed the case due to ‘no ascertainable class.’ This was because determining whether any particular communication was a prohibited ‘solicitation’ would require individualized inquiry into whether the communication qualified as a solicitation under 7.03 ( e.g., was it ‘substantially motivated pecuniary gain,’ did the prospective client reach out first, etc.); whether one of the exemptions to Rule 7.03 applied (e.g., was the prospective client a lawyer, a family member or close friend, or an ‘experienced user’ of legal services); and whether the case runner was acting as the firm’s agent.”
• Decision: here.

David Kluft asks: “Can I mediate a dispute about ownership of a company and then appear as counsel in a related dispute about the same company?” —

• “A TX lawyer mediated a dispute between a sister and brother over part ownership of an investment company. Later, an Investor sued the sister in a separate litigation, claiming that the terms of the settlement with the brother in the first litigation constituted a misuse of company assets.”
• “The mediator’s law firm appeared in the second case for the Investor, and the sister moved to disqualify the mediator under Rule 1.12 (neutral can’t represent party in same matter).”
• “Apparently, the mediator’s firm ran a conflict check before taking the case, but the sister had gotten married and changed her name in the interim, so they didn’t notice the conflict.”
• “The mediator’s firm argued they should not be disqualified anyway because it was not the same ‘matter’ (i.e., it was a different litigation), but the TX Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that what qualifies as a ‘matter’ under the rule depends on the facts and circumstances, and here it was the same matter because it involves the same company and even some of the same payments.”
• “The Court also found that the firm’s screening was inadequate, so the whole firm was disqualified. However, another firm that that had already appeared as co-counsel for the Investor alongside the mediator’s firm was not disqualified by imputation absent specific evidence it received information from the mediator.”
• Decision: here.

“Bradley Arant Facing Convicted CEO’s Malpractice Claims, Bid for Removal From Case” —

• “Bradley Arant Boult Cummings is facing charges of legal malpractice in Alabama from a disgraced former health care CEO who alleges the firm dually represented him and his former company while it worked to oust him and then ‘concealed the conflict for more than two decades.'”
• “Richard Scrushy, founder and former CEO of HealthSouth—a company now called Encompass Health—also wants Bradley removed as his counsel in a separate civil case dating from the early 2000s because of the alleged conflict. The move could lead to overturning a $3.2 billion verdict against him.”
• “Scrushy’s attorney, Johnathan Austin of Austin Law in Birmingham said in an interview Bradley was not involved in mere ‘concurrent representation’ of both parties. ‘This was Bradley Arant representing Richard Scrushy and then going and representing HealthSouth directly adverse to Richard Scrushy,’ Austin said.”
• “The malpractice case followed Scrushy’s filing of new motions in a civil case dating from the early 2000s in which Scrushy was found liable for $3.2 billion in damages related to a high-profile accounting fraud and bribery scheme that led to his ouster from his job and ultimate prison time.”
• “Scrushy wants Bradley removed as his attorney in the civil case, titled Wade Tucker v. Richard M. Scrushy, because he did not know the firm was representing him and HealthSouth until he discovered documents earlier this year that a now-deceased company official had in his possession, Austin said.”
• “Austin said Scrushy believes the firm knew about the conflict even as the firm was representing both him and HealthSouth while the company was accusing him of fraud, filing false corporate reports and making false statements in court.”
• “In 2003, Scrushy was accused of filing false corporate reports and making false statements in Alabama state court related to a multi-billion-dollar accounting fraud scheme at HealthSouth—which included an FBI raid of his office.”
• “He was later acquitted of fraud but then was charged in federal court with money laundering, extortion, racketeering, bribery and obstruction of justice related to charges he bribed then-Gov. Don Siegelman. Scrushy was found guilty of bribery and conspiracy to commit wire fraud in 2007, sentenced to prison, and released in 2012.”
• “However, while in prison, a civil case related to the HealthSouth accounting fraud led to him being found liable for $3.2 billion in damages—a case in which Scrushy now is wanting Bradley disqualified from representing him so the verdict could be overturned and the case reopened.”
• “In the Wade Tucker case, Judge Elisebeth French heard arguments in the disqualification case Nov. 13. Scrushy made motions to disqualify Bradley under Bar rules 1.7, 1.9 and 1.10 dealing with current and former clients and imputation of conflicts of interest, as well as rule 3.7 concerning attorneys not representing Bradley in the Nov. 13 hearing because they were necessary witnesses in the case, Austin said. The judge denied the rule 3.7 motion from the bench and has not ruled on the others, he said.”
• “In the malpractice case, Scrushy names as defendants the Bradley firm and firm partner Chris Glenos, retired partner Meade Whitaker, and ‘John/Jane Doe Partners 1-10’ who were ‘decision-making partners’ and ‘responsible for authorizing of concealing the conflicted representation.'”
• “Bradley was scheduled to file its answer Friday but convinced the judge to delay filing because the firm’s new lawyer in the case, Tabor Novak III of Starnes Davis Florie in Birmingham, needed more time to learn about it, Austin said.”
• “Scrushy alleges that Bradley lawyers in 1998 were hired to represent him and his interests but later began representing HealthSouth in 2002 ‘first on corporate matters, then in positions increasingly adverse to Mr. Scrushy.'”
  ‘Bradley never notified Mr. Scrushy of this dual allegiance,’ the complaint states. ‘Instead, it suppressed and concealed this conflict while benefiting from privileged access to [Scrushy’s] strategy and decision-making.'”
• “But an affidavit by the firm’s former partner, Whitaker, that was filed in the Wade Tucker case in August stated that he represented the firm in Scrushy’s personal real estate and trademark matters but said he was not part of the firm’s representation of HealthSouth as part of the fraud investigation.”

“Rule on Multidistrict Litigation’s First Steps Goes Into Effect” —

• “A new federal rule governing the first steps for multidistrict litigation is set to take effect Monday [12/1], the result of years of debate over the measure and what it should include.”
• “Multidistrict litigation now makes up well over half of all federal civil cases, with lawsuits that address product liability and other topics consolidated before one judge to avoid them being filed in different courts and resulting in potentially different pretrial rulings. The new rule, 16.1 under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is meant to give judges and parties a framework to get those cases off the ground, while still giving them the chance to modify them as needed for each case.”
• “Those opening steps include an initial management conference to figure out pretrial proceedings. The rule also says parties should provide a report ahead of that conference to lay out their views on whether leadership counsel should be appointed in the case, and if so, what their roles should be.”
• “Parties should also tell the court their initial views on discovery in the litigation, how parties will share information about the factual bases behind their arguments, and the main factual and legal issues that are likely to come up, the rule says.”
• “Some lawyers told Bloomberg Law they had concerns about earlier drafts of the rule, saying too much rigidity would hurt the MDL process by forcing courts to follow steps that don’t fit all cases. The Judicial Conference’s Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure unanimously approved a version that its authors said was meant to be adaptable.”
• “Some plaintiffs’ lawyers also testified that they thought too many topics were included in the list of items that could be addressed at the initial hearing. The advisory committee drafting the rule said it’s not meant to serve as a mandatory agenda that requires a view on each listed issue.”
• “Class action lawyers also told Bloomberg Law the rule seemed focused more on mass tort MDLs rather than their cases, which commonly involve data breaches, privacy, and antitrust issues.”
• “The rule has its supporters. Implementing initial steps in the cases gives a pathway for finding and dismissing claims that don’t belong in the litigation, said Alex Dahl, general counsel for the advocacy group Lawyers for Civil Justice, which has pushed for the new MDL rule.”
• “‘This rule should strongly discourage the filing of meritless claims and give courts and parties an effective mechanism for identifying and dismissing them at the early stages of a new MDL,’ Dahl said in a statement.”