Bressler Risk Blog

“Shell Unit’s Failed Atty DQ Bid Faulted For Lack Of Research” —

• “U.S. District Judge Nancy F. Atlas declined to sanction oil field technology company Enventure Global Technology Inc., a Royal Dutch Shell PLC subsidiary, for its bid to disqualify the attorneys for oil field equipment provider Weatherford International Ltd., but she did note that the sanctions bid was ‘not unfounded.'”
• “‘It appears that plaintiff’s unsuccessful attempt to disqualify opposing counsel was the result of a lack of sufficient factual and legal research and analysis, apparently due in part to the difficulty of obtaining complete records about an alleged attorney-client relationship many years ago,’ Judge Atlas said.”
• “In October, Enventure filed a bid, under seal, to disqualify Weatherford’s current in-house counsel, William Imwalle, claiming he previously served as counsel for Enventure. By extension, it argued that Weatherford’s other in-house counsel, Brian Welborn, and outside counsel Heim Payne & Chorush LLP should be disqualified as well.”
• “Enventure was created out of a joint venture between Shell Technology Venture Inc. and Halliburton Energy Services in July 1998. Imwalle served as legal counsel to Halliburton from July 1994 to January 2014 and, while there, occasionally interacted with Enventure in connection with various intellectual property matters.”
• “‘Enventure had its own in-house attorneys during this time, and Mr. Imwalle never signed an engagement letter or other representation agreement with Enventure,’ Judge Atlas said Friday. ‘Mr. Imwalle was not involved in the prosecution of any of the patents that Enventure asserts against Weatherford in this case.'”
• “Imwalle says his interaction with Enventure was “infrequent and limited,” which Judge Atlas said was backed up by exhibits submitted by Enventure itself, which show that he interacted with the company once every few years.”
• “Enventure’s claims that Imwalle “directed” the company in its patent prosecution is ‘directly contradicted by the record evidence,’ Judge Atlas found, noting that disqualification of Imwalle is ‘in no way warranted.'”

And here’s the latest from the eagle-eyed Bill Freivogel:

• “Cortez v. LandCare USA, LLC, No B298044 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Unpub. Dec. 10, 2020). This is a class action against LandCare by employees for under-compensation. The case contains two separate conflict issues unrelated to class nature of case.
  • In the first, a lawyer from Law Firm 1 representing the LandCare claimed Law Firm 1 represented five other employees. She later corrected that, saying only that she would arrange to produce them for depositions. The trial court disqualified the Law Firm 1. In this unpublished opinion the appellate court reversed holding that the Law Firm 1 had, in fact, not represented the five employees, notwithstanding the partner’s earlier misstatement that it had.
  • The second issue relates to Law Firm 2, which showed up representing two of the aforementioned five employees. Defendant LandCare is paying Law Firm 2’s fees. Law Firm 2 had earlier represented LandCare on other matters. Law Firm 2 obtained the two client’s written consent to this arrangement. Nevertheless, the trial court disqualified Law Firm 2. In this opinion, the appellate court reversed. The court said the compensation arrangement and the earlier representation of LandCare were not enough to constitute a disqualifying conflict. The court was particularly moved by the potential harm to the two employees if Law Firm 2 were disqualified.”
• “Van Ryn v. Goland, No. 530037 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t Dec. 3, 2020). In this divorce-related case H and W are contesting how H’s pension should be divided.
  • W’s lawyer had drafted an earlier settlement agreement on that point. It now appears that the agreement was somewhat ambiguous, resulting in this disagreement. H moved to disqualify W’s lawyer because the lawyer may be liable to W for malpractice, depending upon how the court finally rules on division of the pension.
  • The trial court denied the motion to disqualify. In this opinion the appellate court affirmed, finding that the possibility of the lawyer’s liability to W is, at this point, ‘entirely conjectural.'”

“Ex-Client Sues Am Law 200 Firm Over Its Catholic Church Representation, Alleging Conflict” —

• “A New Mexico woman is suing her former lawyers at Phoenix-based law firm Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie for malpractice related to its representation of her in bringing allegations that she was sexually abused by a Catholic school teacher.”
• “Attorneys for the former client, referred to as “Jane Doe” in the suit to protect her identity, said Lewis Roca attorneys steered her away from filing a civil lawsuit against Rhode Island Catholic institution Portsmouth Abbey School for failing to protect her from a predatory teacher when she was a student from 2012 to 2014. It wasn’t until the middle of 2020 when “Doe” learned that she could have brought a civil case against the school had she done so before turning 21, according to the suit.”
• “The complaint also argues that Lewis Roca failed to disclose to “Doe” potential conflicts of interest in representing her due to the school’s payment of her case’s lawyer’s fees and the firm’s history of defending the Catholic Church against claims brought by survivors of clerical abuse.”
• “‘If you have such a clear conflict where you routinely represent the church in cases brought by victims of sexual abuse, you have an obligation to tell that to a prospective or new client who has a potential case against the church, because there’s an obvious conflict there,’ Neil Gehlawat, an attorney with Los Angeles firm Taylor & Ring who is representing the unnamed plaintiff, said in an interview.””The firm also failed to inform Doe that they routinely defended the Catholic Church in claims brought by abuse survivors, and had a potential conflict of interest when Portsmouth Abbey paid for plaintiff’s lawyers’ fees, the complaint alleged.”
• “Reached for comment Wednesday, a spokesperson for Lewis Roca said in an emailed statement that the claims in Doe’s suit are without merit. ‘The firm intends to respond to the complaint by showing that the written scope of the firm’s engagement was narrow and did not include the subjects alleged in the complaint, and that the firm did not have a conflict of interest. We know the true facts will come out, and the firm looks forward to its day in court,’ the firm statement said.”

“AG did not fully disclose campaign contributions from firm tapped to lead fight against JUUL” —

• “When Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison decided to sue a giant e-cigarette manufacturer last year, he called it his duty to take on the legal fight. On Thursday, he expanded the lawsuit against JUUL Labs, Inc. by adding tobacco company Altria to the list of defendants in the case. Altria bought a 35% stake in JUUL in 2018.”
• “Except, Ellison and his staff are not actually leading the court battle against those companies which are accused of deceptively advertising addictive products to youth. Instead, the attorney general picked two Minneapolis-based law firms to handle a case that could potentially lead to millions of dollars in legal fees if the state wins or settles out of court.”
• “Yet, when Ellison asked lawmakers to review the contract last year, he did not disclose that one of the firms, Robins Kaplan, had been a longtime supporter of his career in public office. The firm’s political action committee donated to his run for attorney general as well as his previous congressional campaigns, according to state and federal campaign finance records reviewed by 5 INVESTIGATES. Ellison also did not tell lawmakers that a partner at the firm, Richard Allyn, led Ellison’s transition team after he won the election in November 2018.”
• “But Richard Painter, an expert in legal ethics at the University of Minnesota, says Ellison’s failure to report even the appearance of a conflict raises serious ethical concerns. ‘The decision-makers shouldn’t have to prowl around on the internet looking for campaign contributions,” Painter said. “It should all be right there in the paperwork for the contract.'”
• “While both firms acknowledged having partners that supported Ellison’s campaign for attorney general, they claimed that support did not present ‘any factual or potential conflicts of interest,’ according to a memo provided to the Legislative Advisory Committee, which reviewed the contract.”

Scouring the internet for risk nuggets on a Sunday morning — hey, everyone needs a hobby — I came across an interesting resource. Linked below is workshop developed and presented by counsel for the University System of New Hampshire. Across a dozen pages, it provides a really excellent overview of several conflicts and professional responsibility issues, along with the step-by-step analysis and resolution of several hypotheticals and strands.

This all reminded me of a recent risk round table event I sat in on where the topic of staff training and development was in focus. I suspect we’ll see more interest in this arena as organizations navigate those challenges in 2021 and beyond.

For now, see:  “Ethics: Managing Conflicts of Interest, Attorney Client Privilege, and Other Thorny Issues when Serving as Foundation Legal Counsel or Working with Your Campus Foundation” —

• “Assume for purposes of this part of the outline that you serve as counsel to a university. Do you also, by virtue of your status as corporate counsel, serve as counsel to all the university’s subsidiaries and affiliates—including a separately incorporated supporting foundation?”
• “Obviously, if the university’s lawyer is not the foundation’s lawyer, then there’s no conflict possibility to analyze. But if corporate or ethical or other precepts assign to that lawyer the responsibility for corporate subsidiaries and affiliates, there might be if the corporation and its affiliate are adverse to one another. So the follow-up question is whether, if the university’s lawyer does function as counsel to the
  foundation, there is a potential conflict. Under what circumstances? How can a putative conflict be managed or mitigated?”
• “We come, then, to the second strand of our analysis. Assume that one lawyer represents both university and foundation. Under what circumstances does that “concurrent representation,” to use the nomenclature in Rule 1.7, give rise to potential conflicts of interest? And how can conflicts be mitigated? Let’s examine the text of Rule 1.7, with some annotations:”

For more, see the complete workshop.

David Zetoony, Co-Chair of Greenberg Traurig’s U.S. Data, Privacy and Cybersecurity Practice presents an excellent, in-depth analysis: “GDPR: Law Firm Information Collection; Processors or Controllers?” —

• “Are law firms considered ‘processors’ or ‘controllers’ of the personal data that they receive from clients as part of a representation? It depends.”
• “Many lawyers (and clients) incorrectly assume that attorneys must be processors because they are service providers of their clients. In some situations, a service provider has a role in determining the purposes and means of processing; when that occurs the service provider is, like its client, considered a ‘controller’ or a ‘joint controller.'”
• “The Article 29 Working Party took the position that if a service provider has a ‘traditional role and professional expertise’ that required it to determine the purpose and means of processing, that independent expertise could convert the service provider into a controller. They specifically noted that in situations in which a ‘barrister represents his/her client in court, and in relation to this mission, processes personal data related to the client’s case’ the barrister is a controller.[2] Their logic appears to be that the instruction that a client provides to their attorney is not necessarily to process data, but, rather, to represent the client’s interest before a court. Because the processing of data is an ancillary function that is wholly (or partially) determined by the attorney independent from the client, the attorneys’ processing should be conceptualized as that of a controller.”
• “The UK ICO – the supervisory authority for the United Kingdom – reached a similar conclusion in the context of discussing whether a solicitor would be a processor or a controller… The view of the ICO was echoed by The Bar Council of England and Wales, which stated in a memorandum that ‘[f]or the avoidance of doubt, self-employed barristers are data controllers of their client’s data. They are not data processors.'”
• “The guidance of the Article 29 Working Party, the UK ICO, the UK Bar Council, and the German Council of Data Protection Commissioners leaves open the possibility that in some situations an attorney could, however, act as a processor and not a controller. For example, if a client retained a law firm for the express purpose of processing data (e.g., conducting document review or hosting a document room), and provided specific direction and control regarding how the data was to be processed (e.g., the client selected or approved the type of software that would be used during a document review and how the documents would be stored and processed) an argument could be made that the attorney is, in fact, functioning as a processor and not as a controller.”
• “Even in situations in which it appears that a client has provided specific directions and retains a large degree of control, a law firm may still find itself acting as a controller with regard to data if it is required to process data outside of those client instructions in order to comply with regulatory or professional obligations.[7] For example, an argument could be made that a law firm acts as a controller of data if it is required to (i) carry out internal conflicts and other regulatory checks on new client matters or to undertake appropriate client due diligence in accordance with anti-money laundering laws; (ii) subject to duties of confidentiality and privilege, cooperate with regulators and other public authorities (including by responding to regulatory requests for information; undertaking internal investigations and complying with reporting and other professional obligations), or (iii) disclose personal data over a client’s objection to a court during the course of litigation.”

“Big Lots’ Ohio Attys Wrongfully DQ’d From Calif. Wage Fight” —

• “A California appellate court has vacated the disqualification of several Ohio attorneys representing Big Lots in an overtime pay dispute, determining that a state court jumped the gun by revoking their temporary admission to work on the putative class action after they solicited current and former employees.”
• “Rather than disqualify the Vorys Sater Seymour & Pease LLP attorneys, the San Diego County Superior Court could have temporarily barred them from continuing to solicit the discount retailer’s current and former employees in the case while it sorted out the dispute, the Fourth Appellate District held Friday.”
• “The lower court could have determined whether by contacting store and district managers who could prospectively be deposed in the case, Vorys lawyers Michael J. Ball, Jocelyn M. Hoffman and Daniel J. Clark were engaging in ethical misconduct that called for a corrective action, the three-judge panel determined.”
• “‘But in advance of such a hearing and appropriately supported findings, the circumstances did not justify barring all further participation by Big Lots’ counsel of choice based on conduct that occurred before the issue was ever presented to the trial court,’ the opinion said.”
• “‘The evidence adduced so far merely shows that Vorys and Big Lots innocently misinterpreted two pro forma orders granting routine pro hac vice applications,’ the opinion said. ‘Without more, that is an insufficient basis to effectively disqualify Big Lots’ counsel of choice.'”
• “A California federal court also weighed in on the dispute involving the Vorys attorneys in a related case. It determined in May that the lawyers did not exceed the scope of the authority the federal court granted them when they asked the workers if they wished for the firm to represent them as they participated in depositions as nonparty witnesses.”

“Alleged Pillow Talk Via Email” —

• “An attorney who allegedly provided his spouse with unfettered access to his law firm email account has been charged with violations of the duty of confidentiality by Ohio Disciplinary Counsel.”
• “The spouse is not an attorney and was not employed by the law firm. She is a ‘content metadata specialist for a large corporation.'”
• “The conduct was discovered by the firm shortly after the attorney moved to another firm when one of the attorney’s former clients sought the case file. An associate with access to his computer files found “derogatory” comments about firm employees.”
• “He allegedly gave his user name, password and firm domain information to his spouse one week after starting there. He was at the firm for nearly four years. The remarkable allegations are that he shared client confidential financial information with his spouse, that she had regular access to “client names, case types and descriptions of their legal issues,” and that she reviewed and sometimes edited his work emails.”

And Noel Semple is Assistant Professor at the University of Windsor Faculty of Law writes on SLAW: “If You See Something, Say Nothing: Why Lawyers Don’t Report to the Law Society” —

• “In identifying professional misconduct, legal regulators are heavily reliant on client complaints and receive relatively little help from practitioners. For example, 71% of complaints to the Law Society of Ontario in 2019 were brought forward by members of the public (typically clients) while only 12% came from legal professionals. The problem is that there are many forms of professional misconduct that only professionals, and not clients, can readily identify. Misconduct therefore goes undetected, leaving clients and others to be victimized by bad lawyers who should have been caught after previous offences.”
• “Lawyers have a duty to report certain types of misconduct, which listed in Rule 7.1-3. This includes any ‘conduct that raises a substantial question as to another licensee’s honesty, trustworthiness, or competency as a licensee’ and ‘any situation in which a lawyer’s clients are likely to be materially prejudiced.’ It is not clear that this rule is sufficiently understood and appreciated by practicing lawyers. I have personally heard lawyers describe professional misconduct which they would undoubtedly characterize as passing these thresholds, without any sense that reporting it might be an ethical obligation.”
• “Why don’t legal professionals complain more often about the bad eggs? I have asked lawyers this question. Some do not think the Law Society will do anything even if they do complain. Others are reluctant to play the role of ‘snitch’ or ‘tattle-tale.’ They perceive that their professional relationships will suffer if they complain about a fellow lawyer, even if the complaint is amply warranted. A complaint might create a grudge which would make it difficult to work with the individual in the future.”
• See the complete article for recommendations and community commentary

“NY Ethics Opinion on Judicial Screening: Ethics Opinions 1209” —

• “A former appellate judge, who was on a panel which issued a dispositive order about the scope of an easement, is personally disqualified from representing the owner of the servient estate of the same easement with respect to legal questions involving obstructions to the easement, equitable relief, adverse possession, and “overburdening” of the easement. However, the firm to which the former appellate judge is counsel may, pursuant to Rule 1.12(d), undertake the representation upon appropriate screening and notification.”
• “The inquirer is a New York lawyer who formerly served as a New York State appellate judge. Ten years ago, inquiring counsel was on a panel which issued a dispositive order confirming the validity and scope of an easement. Inquiring counsel, having retired from the bench, is now “of counsel” to a firm. That firm has been approached by the owner of the servient estate of the same easement with respect to questions involving the potential legal effect of obstructions to the easement, the possible availability of equitable relief to the owner of the dominant estate, the applicability of adverse possession, and whether subdivision of the dominant estate would result in an “overburdening” of the easement.”
• “Rule 1.12(a) of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct (“Rules”) provides: ‘A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter upon the merits of which the lawyer has acted in a judicial capacity.'”
• “‘A conflict under Rule 1.12(a) is a non-waivable conflict’ (N.Y. State 1064, ¶ 4 (2015)), and should be read in conjunction with both the New York Code of Judicial Conduct (22 NYCRR Part 100) and Judiciary Law § 17”
• “If the inquirer’s law firm complies with Rule 1.12(d) by promptly and properly screening off the inquirer and by providing the specified notifications, and if no other circumstances in the particular representation create an appearance of impropriety, then Rule 1.12 will not prohibit the firm from accepting the representation despite the inquirer’s personal disqualification.”

“Calif. Judge DQ’d From Atty Fees Fight In Water Plan Dispute” —

• “A California appeals court Tuesday ruled that a lower court judge should be disqualified from hearing a dispute over attorney fees after the Imperial Irrigation District fended off a challenge to its water distribution plan, ruling the district had the right to request a new judge after its initial loss in the case was overturned on appeal.”
• “After Abatti won an initial judgment overturning the plan in superior court, the judge awarded him costs and attorney fees. That order was then reversed and the case remanded by California’s Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One for a new decision on fees and costs.”
• “The district subsequently filed a motion to disqualify the superior court judge overseeing the remanded case, as it was his judgment that awarded the fees to the opposing party. But that judge denied the disqualification bid on the basis that a second peremptory challenge cannot be made before a ‘final judgment’ is declared.”
• “Justices Judith McConnell, Patricia D. Benke and Patricia Guerrero for the Fourth Appellate District, Division One granted a post-appeal motion in favor of the district, writing in an unpublished opinion Tuesday that because its reversal on appeal resolved a monetary dispute, the remanded order constitutes a ‘final judgment’ as well as a ‘new trial’ and therefore allows for new peremptory challenges.”
• “In its petition to the appellate court, the district said Abatti was initially awarded over $300,000 in attorney fees and over $25,000 in costs. It further alleged that the judge overseeing the decision, the Honorable L. Brooks Anderholt, had ‘deep connections’ and a ‘proclivity toward’ Abatti.”
• “While not addressing those accusations specifically, the panel asserted the district’s right to disqualify the judge.”

This month’s sponsor thank you to our supporter Accuity features an interview with Mike Guernon, Global Director of Intake, Risk & Compliance at Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP.

Listen to him explore: “How COVID-19 will Affect Risk Functions in Law Firms” —

• “We’ve got a large global footprint so we’re always dealing with a number of compliance issues that arise out of new legislation, new laws, new rules, new opinions. And my role has been and throughout my career is just to identify ways to improve the workflow and find the right tools. Whether it’s resources or technology that really take the sting out of the bureaucratic delays that can come with some of the compliance issues. Our focus has always been making it very efficient, making it painless and really raising the overall amount of compliance that we get… our forucs is really to be proactive about these risk issues.”
• “…everyone had to take drastic steps. We found ourselves in an unique position in that we had to be responsive to all of our clients’ needs. They had many questions, whether it was the state by state policies or some of the federal policies as they as they came about. And there was a concern to really be super responsive to what new markets and new demands were arising. At the same time, in our experience on the risk mitigation side, we were well familiar with similar events like the 2008 recession where you had similar reactions from the markets and from clients. And this very, very vocal need to get things done quickly. But our takeaways and I think risk management throughout law firm and legal.”
• “A key takeaways from 2008 was the amount of claims that would exponentially rise like 12 to 16 months after an event like that are alarming because people are anxious to get to the work. Sometimes in an attempt to do that, some of the risk protocols can sort of be overlooked. So our focus right from the jump was to be very, very responsive to our attorney needs, while at the same time making sure we were missing any of the critical steps from the basic to run the conflicts analysis within our database to make sure we didn’t have an ethical issue.”
• Listen to the complete podcast here.

See Also: Past Interviews from Accuity (in PDF form):

• Exploring issues including: strategies for making the case to invest in risk management, training and developing conflicts staff and navigating Outside Counsel Guidelines: “In Discussion with A Law Firm Risk Expert“
• Discussing topics including: current conflicts trends, the pressures facing conflicts teams, the opportunity for innovation in staffing model and technology: “In Discussion with A Law Firm Conflicts Expert”

“Reality of law firms’ approach to AML not living up to their policies” —

• “There is a difference between many law firms’ anti-money laundering (AML) policies and procedures, and what actually happens in practice, the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) has found.”
• “It also revealed that nearly two-thirds of the firms it reviewed in the first year of a new programme of AML checks needed ‘some form of engagement’ with the regulator as a result.”
• “The regulator said, in a report published this week, that these failings included ‘a lack of an effective compliance framework, or indeed a lack of any AML policies, controls, and procedures at all.'”
• “In other cases, at least half the files reviewed had “serious issues” such as a lack of due diligence, or the firm had a money laundering compliance officer who ‘did not appear to understand their obligations and was failing to carry out their role properly.'”
• “The SRA said that a large number of files showed differences between the firm’s policies and procedures and ‘what actually happened on the ground.’ However, the regulator said the law firms were ‘for the most part, united in their determination to keep the proceeds of crime out of their client accounts, and we were able to assist many of them in meeting their obligations.”
• “Speaking at the SRA’s virtual COLP and COFA conference yesterday, Zoe Allen-Robinson, its AML proactive supervision manager, said the majority of law firms ‘took their obligations seriously.'”
• “Suzie Ogilvie, global head of financial crime and sanctions at top City firm Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, said the pandemic had created ‘a number of challenges’ in terms of AML, such as a rise in impersonation frauds because lawyers were not meeting people face-to-face.”

“NJ Judge Disciplined for Refusing to Step Down From Her Landlord’s Cases” —

• “Lilia Munoz, a municipal court judge in Union City and Guttenberg, has been reprimanded by the state Supreme Court for a long-running and undisclosed conflict of interest.”
• “Munoz violated the canons of judicial conduct by presiding over multiple cases in which parties were represented by Ramon Gonzalez, an attorney who rented office space to her, the court said in an order made public on Monday.”
• “Gonzalez, who has his own law office in the same building, received rent payments from Munoz from 2008 to 2018 for a law office in a building in Union City that he and his spouse owned. And during that time, Gonzalez appeared before Munoz as counsel of record numerous times, in both Union City and Guttenberg, according to the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct complaint.”
• “Munoz, through her defense attorney, Robert Feder, admitted to the allegations in the complaint and that those facts constituted violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, according to a stipulation issued by the committee.”
• “The court also found Munoz violated an ethics rule requiring judges to disqualify themselves in proceedings where any factor might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead attorneys or parties to believe so.”
• “Among the various levels of discipline imposed on judges who commit ethical violations, a reprimand is more serious than an admonition, but less so than a censure, although each has a similar practical impact on the life of the judge.”

“Greenberg Traurig Clears Conflict Inquiry In $1B Fraud Case” —

• “A Tennessee federal judge on Friday found that potential conflicts of interest do exist between several attorneys representing a pharmacy owner and pharmacies accused of a $1 billion insurance scheme, but waived the conflicts pertaining to a pair of Greenberg Traurig LLP lawyers.”
• “In the suit, the government alleges that pharmacy owner Larry Smith, seven pharmacies and several other individuals conspired to deceive tens of thousands of patients and more than 100 doctors across the country in an elaborate scheme that attempted to bilk private health care insurers out of $931 million.”
• “Prosecutors raised concerns about possible conflicts of interest in the case in March, asking the court to further probe the matter. Specifically, they said Greenberg Traurig shareholder Gregory Kehoe, who represents Smith and two associated companies, previously represented a pair of potential witnesses in the case when they were deposed in a related civil suit in Florida.”
• “U.S. District Judge J. Ronnie Greer on Friday granted the government’s motion for judicial inquiry into possible conflicts of interest but found that the potential conflicts involving Kehoe and fellow Greenberg Traurig shareholder Danielle Kemp were waivable.”
• “‘Kehoe and Kemp properly obtained waivers from Smith and the two potential witnesses,’ the judge said. ‘The court has hereby accepted the waivers… [T]he content of the waivers reasonably ensure Smith made an informed decision to accept their continued representation'”
• “Specifically, the waivers Kehoe and Kemp obtained contained explanations and disclosures that adequately informed their client and former clients of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of action, according to the order.”

“Ex-NRA Execs Fear Attorney Is Shielding LaPierre at the Group’s Expense” —

• “In early 2018, the National Rifle Association, alarmed by growing scrutiny from oversight agencies in New York State, hired attorney William A. Brewer III and his firm to fend off the threat. Rather than compromise, Brewer attacked. Today, the NRA — once considered the most powerful interest group in American politics — faces the prospect of extinction.”
• “Some NRA members and a handful of the gun group’s former leaders have long charged that Brewer has imperiled the organization by prioritizing the interests of chief executive Wayne LaPierre. Only recently has LaPierre gotten his own attorney in cases that involved both the NRA boss and the organization. LaPierre’s new attorney and Brewer share history: Both have worked for a development group behind a proposed ice skating complex in the Bronx that has been described as the largest in the world.”
• “In Brewer’s first year of service, the NRA paid his firm $19 million, or roughly $1.6 million a month, according to court filings and internal correspondence. If that monthly average has held, the firm has collected upward of $50 million to date — a conservative estimate given how the firm’s NRA workload has grown.’
• “In 2018, the NRA’s audit committee, at Brewer’s direction, started to retroactively approve financial transactions that had benefited insiders. Committee chairman Charles Cotton has defended the approvals, telling The Wall Street Journal that the committee had ‘confirmed that the services were rendered at fair market value and worked in the best interests of the Association.’ According to James’s complaint, however, the committee did not review any relevant records, such as contracts, so it failed to meet a state requirement that nonprofits approve only insider transactions that are determined to be ‘fair, reasonable and in the corporation’s best interest.'”
• “Arulanandam [NRA Public Affairs Director] said the firm has ‘helped the NRA prevail in a wide range of matters’ and pointed to the legal bills dispute, a recent settlement with a New York regulator, and a lawsuit that the NRA filed in 2019 against the city of San Francisco. (The NRA withdrew the San Francisco suit, which was not handled by Brewer’s firm.) ‘We are proud of the firm’s track record for the NRA,” Arulanandam said. “The firm’s scorecard is phenomenal.'”

Wanted to take a moment to wish every reader a Happy Thanksgiving. (And that goes for you international folks too, please find an excuse to eat some pie and hug a loved one this week as well.)

Very thankful for the engaged reader community that’s grown with this blog over the past 18+ months since launch.

I’m grateful in particular to the many who have sent in notes of support, referred friends and colleagues to sign up for updates, emailed articles and links of interest, and generally been nice people on the Internet. (I think more of that, and all of the above is generally a good thing to encourage.)

With hopes of a bit of relaxation and refreshment for all within eyeshot of these pixels, and optimistic wishes for a smoother 2021 and beyond, signing off for a few days.

(Unless there’s a crazy conflict making news. Then I’ll post. >smile<)

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