Bressler Risk Blog

David Kluft asks: “Is it a conflict for an Attorney General to bring criminal charges against a Governor?” —

• “The Northern Mariana Islands Attorney General brought charges against the Governor for theft and misconduct in public office, stemming from the use of public funds for fancy first-class air travel. The Governor’s travel violated a specific travel statute and a more general statute for when ‘A person, being a public official, commits the offense of misconduct in public office if the person, does any illegal act under the color of office.'”
• “The Governor moved to disqualify the entire Office of Attorney General, arguing that the statute by definition was brought against a person in their official capacity, since it can only be violated by a person with a public job. Therefore, the argument goes, since the AG represents the Governor in an official capacity, it can’t now be adverse to him in an official capacity.”
• “The lower court agreed and disqualified the AG, but the N.M.I. Supreme Court reversed on appeal. The statue specifically applies to ‘a person’ who commits a crime ‘under color of office,’ and therefore the statutory language indicates that he is being charged in his personal capacity for doing things in public office he should not have done.”
• “In addition, if he was only a party in his official capacity, he is not Governor anymore so the charges would now be irrelevant, which was plainly not the case. Disqualification reversed.”
• Decision: here.

“Motion to disqualify former Connecticut Assistant Attorney General denied in generic drug antitrust MDL” —

• “The defendants who sought to disqualify ex-Connecticut counsel from representing private plaintiffs in connection with similar antitrust and restraint of trade claims did not show a violation of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct.”
• “In the large and long-running generic drug price fixing multi-district litigation, there was no valid stated reason to disqualify a former Connecticut assistant attorney general who joined a private law firm representing private plaintiffs Molina Healthcare and Humana Inc. after having represented Connecticut with respect to the same or similar antitrust claims, held the federal district court in Philadelphia. The former Connecticut attorney did not violate the Pennsylvania rules of professional conduct.”
• “The court did not find any prejudice where all parties were sharing nearly all information in question pursuant to pre-trial orders (PTOs) during the course of routine discovery (In Re: Generic Pharmaceuticals Pricing Antitrust Litigation, No. 2:20-cv-06303-CMR (E.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2026)).”
• Decision: here.

“Judge declines to recuse himself after Minnesota’s U.S. Attorney sought removal from immigration case” —

• “A federal judge has declined to recuse himself from an immigration case after Minnesota’s U.S. Attorney raised concerns about an alleged appearance of partiality over his marriage to the state’s solicitor general.”
• “In an order issued Friday, U.S. District Judge Jeffrey Bryan determined ‘no reasonable person’ could believe his marriage to Liz Kramer — the lead counsel in Minnesota’s lawsuit against the Trump administration’s immigration surge — might influence his view in the immigration case. He rejected the federal prosecutor’s claim that he had not disclosed his marriage before, calling it a ‘well-known’ fact that’s been mentioned in many court filings in cases from which he’s recused himself since they involved the Minnesota Attorney General’s Office and the U.S. Attorney’s Office.”
• “Bryan also wrote that he and lawyers from the U.S. Attorney’s Office have had ‘more than one casual conversation’ about his wife several months before. ‘The Court presumes Respondents’ counsel was not willfully misleading when he suggested that he only just learned of this fact a few days ago,’ Bryan said.”
• “U.S. Attorney Daniel Rosen raised the issue in a motion filed Thursday, calling for Bryan to recuse himself after learning about the marriage through ‘public media sources’ and determined the judge’s ‘impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’ Rosen said the arguments raised by Kramer in the state’s ongoing lawsuit against Operation Metro Surge are similar to the ones cited in the immigration case overseen by Bryan. Rosen specifically drew parallels in the state’s lawsuit and the immigration case about allegations of warrantless arrests, racial profiling, arrests of U.S. citizens and more during the surge of federal immigration agents to Minnesota.”
• “Bryan ruled Rosen’s claim is ‘not persuasive,’ saying the arguments listed by Rosen are merely ‘general background facts’ about Operation Metro Surge that the U.S. government has not disputed in any of the more than 1,000 habeas cases filed since the deployment began Dec. 1. Bryan determined the arguments made in the state’s broader lawsuit are also fundamentally different from the immigrant’s habeas case — which seeks to challenge the immigrant’s detention.”
• “Bryan added that Rosen had not met with the immigrant’s attorney prior to making his recusal request, despite the court’s rules for parties to meet before filing any motion. Daniel Suitor, the attorney for the immigrant, previously told the Minnesota Star Tribune he was surprised over the motion and later filed a motion opposing the recusal request.”

“Glass Lewis Opposes Samsung Life, Fire & Marine Board Nominees Over Conflict Concerns” —

• “Global proxy advisory firm Glass Lewis has come out against the appointment of outside directors at Samsung Life Insurance and Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance. The firm cited potential conflicts of interest, noting that the nominees’ law firms have provided legal services to the companies.”
• “According to financial industry sources on March 13, Glass Lewis recommended against the reappointment of Lim Chae-min as an outside director and audit committee member at Samsung Life Insurance in its proxy report for institutional investors. The firm also recommended voting against the new appointment of Kim Jae-shin as an outside director at Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance.”
• “Glass Lewis raised concerns that law firm Lee & Ko, where Lim serves as an advisor, provided legal services to Samsung Group in 2024-2025. The firm warned this could create conflicts between board decisions and personal interests, and could influence the company’s selection of legal services.”
• “‘Given that the current board does not have a sufficient proportion of outside directors, we find it difficult to support a candidate with such ties,’ Glass Lewis said.”
• “The proxy advisor opposed Kim’s nomination at Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance for similar reasons. Kim currently serves as an advisor at Kim & Chang, a law firm that has provided legal services to the company. Glass Lewis added that the board has not secured enough independent directors to provide adequate oversight in protecting shareholder interests.”

“Waivable Conflict from Counsel’s Firm’s Prior Representation of a Victim Bank and Permissible PSR Disclosure to Treatment Providers on Supervised Release” —

• “In United States v. Wells (2d Cir. Mar. 9, 2026) (summary order), defendant-appellant Laurell Wells appealed from a judgment of conviction in the Southern District of New York (Rakoff, J.) following a guilty plea to conspiracy to commit wire and bank fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1349), bank fraud and aiding and abetting (18 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 2), and aggravated identity theft (18 U.S.C. §§ 1028(a)(1), 1028A(b), 2). The district court imposed an aggregate 132-month term of imprisonment and five years of supervised release.”
• “Wells raised two principal issues on appeal:”
  • “Whether the district court erred in denying defense counsel’s motion to withdraw based on an asserted conflict arising from counsel’s firm’s prior representation of Chase Bank, an institutional victim of the charged fraud scheme.”
  • “Whether the district court erred by authorizing disclosure of Wells’s Presentence Report (PSR) and mental-health evaluations to his cognitive behavioral therapy provider as part of supervised release.”
• “The Second Circuit affirmed on both issues. Although the decision is a nonprecedential summary order, it is a useful synthesis of the Circuit’s conflict-waiver framework and its supervision-condition jurisprudence regarding treatment-related disclosures.”
• “The court held that: (1) counsel’s firm’s prior representation of Chase created, at most, a waivable potential conflict, not an ‘actual’ or ‘unwaivable’ conflict; (2) the district court satisfied its duty to inquire and properly conducted a Curcio waiver process, and Wells knowingly and intelligently waived conflict-free representation; and (3) the supervised release authorization allowing the Probation Office to provide the therapist with the PSR and mental-health evaluations was within the court’s broad discretion and was reasonably related to treatment needs under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), without imposing a greater deprivation of liberty than necessary.”
• “The conflict inquiry: the court’s threshold duty: The panel first evaluates whether the district court satisfied its obligation to identify and classify the potential conflict. Applying Lussier and Kliti, it emphasizes that the trial court may rely on counsel’s representations and must determine whether the conflict is actual, potential, or nonexistent. The record showed: (i) counsel disclosed the issue pretrial; (ii) the court required written submissions; (iii) counsel explained why the conflict was ‘background,’ likely not strategically salient, and waivable; and (iv) the court held a hearing to address waiver. That sequence satisfied the inquiry obligation.”
• “Classification: why this was ‘waivable potential,’ not ‘unwaivable’: Wells argued that prior firm representation of Chase (a victim bank) created an ‘actual and unwaivable’ conflict. The panel rejected that framing. Relying on Perez (unwaivable conflicts are rare) and decisions treating prior representation of witnesses/codefendants as generally waivable (Perez, Leslie, Basciano), the court reasoned that:”
  • “Chase was an institutional victim rather than a current client whose interests were being actively advanced in related litigation.”
  • “The firm obtained a conflicts waiver from Chase, which purported to free counsel to cross-examine Chase witnesses without limitation.”
  • “Even when prior representation might affect cross-examination decisions, Second Circuit doctrine treats that as a candidate for disclosure and waiver, not automatic disqualification.”
• “The net doctrinal move is to locate the case within the ordinary Curcio-waiver universe rather than the exceptional ‘no rational defendant’ category that mandates disqualification under Lussier.”
• “Validity of Wells’s waiver: knowing, voluntary, intelligent: The panel upholds the waiver as adequate under Curcio and Arrington. It highlights multiple safeguards:
  • “Wells received notice of the conflict in advance and discussed it in court.”
  • “The district court explained the risk (e.g., less vigorous cross-examination of Chase employees because of the firm relationship).”
  • “The court repeatedly offered to appoint independent counsel to advise Wells, which he declined.”
  • “When Wells later sought to replace counsel, his stated reasons centered on tactical disagreement, not renewed conflict concerns.”
  • “The district court revisited and clarified the conflict on the first day of trial, including eliciting the government’s preview of the Chase witness testimony.”
• “The panel also rejects Wells’s claim that he was coerced into waiver by the prospect of proceeding pro se. It treats the ‘counsel vs. pro se’ choice as arising only after Wells’s tactical dispute, and it invokes Rosemond and Rivernider to explain that strategic friction does not entitle a defendant to new counsel, especially when substitution would disrupt trial.”

David Kluft asks: “Can lawyers who voted for Biden effectively communicate with a client who voted for Trump?” —

• “Two NY plaintiffs sued a law firm for malpractice, alleging that the firm negligently advised them on whether to take a settlement. The plaintiffs proffered a corporate law professor as an expert on ‘legal ethics and the practice of law,’ even though ‘virtually none of his experience involve[d] legal ethics, either generally or specifically.'”
• “The Court noted that the Professor’s opinion was unreliable, including because he misinterpreted an ABA opinion and ‘depart[ed] from the factual record.’ The Professor also came up with a strange speculative method for determining malpractice, musing that because the firm was dominated by Biden supporters (which was not actually true), they were incapable of fulfilling their Rule 1.4 duties to communicate with their Trump supporting clients.”
• “The Court held that the Professor ‘failed to show that researching an individual’s political donations to learn if an attorney has a different political ideology than their client is an accepted or newly innovative method used by legal ethics experts to support a malpractice claim.’ Testimony excluded.”
• Decision: here.

More from David Kluft on AI protective order language:

• “Here’s another AI protective order provision, again from SDNY. This one identifies specific AI that is ok to use for the case:
  • “The Receiving Party shall not load, import, submit, or otherwise transfer Discovery Material produced by the Producing Party to any Large Language Model (“LLM”) or Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) platform, and shall not use data produced by the Producing Party to train AI systems or platforms.”
  • “For the avoidance of doubt, this restriction expressly applies to the use of public advanced large language models, “generative” AI tools, and other advanced AI systems, including but not limited to public versions of OpenAI GPT, ChatGPT3/4 et seq., Google Gemini, Meta LLAMA, MidJourney, DALL-E, and Stable Diffusion.”
  • “The sole exception to this restriction is that the Parties agree that Epiq’s Discovery or Relativity Platforms (collectively referred to as “Epiq”) and WestLaw’s CoCounsel are acceptable industry standard tools that may be used by all Parties as long as data produced by the Producing Party is not used to train AI systems or platforms.”
  • “To the extent that the Receiving Party intends to use any LLM or AI platform, public or private, aside from Epiq or CoCounsel, to analyze produced documents or data, the Receiving Party shall not do so without agreement from the Producing Party. Absent such agreement, the Parties shall meet and confer in an attempt to resolve any privacy and security concerns regarding the use of such LLM or AI platforms.”
  • Text of order: here.

“Quinn’s Ethics Appeal Win Bolsters Attorney-Client Privilege” —

• “An ethics-focused Federal Circuit opinion that potentially spared former Quinn Emanuel client NortonLifeLock nearly $300 million in liability in a patent case also sent a strong cautioning message to judges.”
• “The appeals panel’s decision Wednesday warned district judges to think twice before ordering attorneys to publicly disclose sensitive client communications as punishment when they spot legally questionable tactics, said several lawyers watching the case.”
• “‘What grabbed the court’s attention and likely caused concern’ was an Eastern District of Virginia judge’s unprompted ‘order that required the attorney-client material be filed on the public docket,’ said Andrew Radsch, a patent litigator at Munger Tolles & Olson.”
• “The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a contempt order tied to a Quinn partner’s interactions with Marc Dacier, a former NortonLifeLock employee who was initially represented by the firm as a witness in a high-stakes patent infringement suit Columbia University brought against the company. The appeals court wiped out a $481 million award and addressed the contempt ruling in back-to-back opinions.”
• “The award finding carried additional significance because the district court had added $296 million in enhanced damages, citing the Quinn trial team’s ‘egregious’ conduct in refusing to disclose communications with Dacier. The ex-NortonLifeLock employee appeared to regret his former employer’s conduct but ultimately skipped the Virginia trial.”
• “The Quinn team isn’t out of the woods yet, Radsch said, since the appeals court opinion left the door open for an alternative form of sanctions for its allegedly improper interactions with Dacier.”
• “But in rejecting the district judge’s contempt finding against Quinn, he added, the Federal Circuit said, ‘you shouldn’t be forcing parties to file presumptively privileged material on the public docket—be wary when you do that.'”
• “The ethical dilemmas in the case emerged after Dacier ran into a Columbia professor at a conference during a long lull in the case, according to court documents. He allegedly expressed contrition about an aspect of the case—the actions of a Norton employee he once managed who was accused of taking credit for the professor’s invention. Columbia’s lawyers learned of the alleged apology and contacted Dacier before eventually pushing to have him testify at trial, though he was then living in Saudi Arabia.”
• “District Judge M. Hannah Lauck ultimately found Quinn Emanuel misrepresented a court ruling in one of its communications with Dacier, who was mulling whether to travel to Virginia for the trial.”
• “That finding coincided with the court asking for disclosure of years of Quinn’s communications with Dacier. When the firm refused, it also had to drop the case entirely. Norton brought on Latham & Watkins as a replacement counsel.”
• “‘Quinn ultimately made what looks like the right decision’ in refusing to comply with the disclosure order, said Tyler Maulsby, a litigator and legal ethics specialist at Frankfurt Kurnit.”
• “‘The judge’s order was just breathtaking in that she sua sponte found a conflict of interest, ruled that such a conflict existed, voided a retainer agreement and destroyed the attorney-client privilege in one fell swoop,’ he said.”
• “Maulsby added that part of the Federal Circuit’s concern with the order is it seemed to punish a client—who the attorney-client privilege is meant to protect—for actions of the lawyer.”
• “With the type of disclosure that the district court demanded, ‘appellate courts cannot always ‘unring the bell,’’ wrote Judge Timothy B. Dyk who authored the Federal Circuit opinion.”
• “That put ‘Quinn in this sort of impossible situation where, if they agree to provide the documents, they’ve arguably turned over privileged documents of their client, and, if they don’t, they’re in contempt of a court order,’ Maulsby said. ‘They chose option B.'”

The [California] State Bar’s 29th Annual Statewide Ethics Symposium —

• The State Bar’s 29th Annual Statewide Ethics Symposium will be held on Friday, April 17, 2026, via Zoom. This symposium is hosted by the State Bar of California’s Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct (COPRAC) and provides an educational program for attorneys in all practice areas who are interested in cutting-edge legal ethics issues. Attendees can earn up to five hours of MCLE credit.
• Panels being offered this year:
  • Recent Developments in Legal Ethics and Professional Conduct
  • Is the Use of AI a Choice? AI Is Here
  • Who’s Next? Strategic Succession Planning for Law Firms
  • Beyond the Billable Hour: Rethinking Legal Billing Practices in the Age of AI
• This program is being offered for free and registration is limited. For more information, or to register, visit the Ethics Symposium website.

ProPublica has launched a new database resource: “Explore Financial Disclosures From President Trump and 1,500 of His Appointees” —

• “Use this database to explore potential conflicts of interest for President Donald Trump and his team. The documents disclose positions officials have held outside government, their assets and their debts, among other things.”

For those curious, inputting “LLP” into the search engine is a way to surface individuals specifically associated presently or previously with law firms: https://projects.propublica.org/trump-team-financial-disclosures/search/?q=llp

More on this: “Documents Reveal a Web of Financial Ties Between Trump Officials and the Industries They Help Regulate” —

• “At least a dozen appointees withheld the identities of previous clients, ProPublica found. Appointees are allowed to keep the name of former clients confidential under exceptional circumstances, such as when the identity is protected by a court order or revealing the name would violate the rules of a professional licensing organization. In New York and Washington, D.C., for example, the organizations that license attorneys prohibit them from revealing confidential information about a client in most situations, including if doing so would be embarrassing or is likely to be detrimental to the client. While the relationship between a client and an attorney is often made public, in some cases — if, for instance, an appointee had conducted legal defense work for a client during a nonpublic criminal investigation — the client’s identity could be withheld from the financial disclosure.”
• “Guidelines issued by the Office of Government Ethics say that such situations are unusual and “it is extremely rare for a filer to rely on this exception for more than a few clients.”
• “But at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, which is responsible for tariff policy, the head of the agency, Jamieson Greer, withheld the names of more than 50 former clients from his time at King & Spalding, one of the nation’s most influential law firms. In his disclosure, Greer cited the New York and D.C. bar rules for not identifying the clients.”
• “Greer’s senior adviser in the federal agency, Kwan Kim, previously worked as an international trade lawyer for Covington & Burling. From October 2020 to February 2025, Kim helped businesses win federal exemptions from steel and aluminum tariffs and defended companies accused by investigators of import-related crimes, according to a Covington biography that has since been taken down. Kim kept the names of 52 companies he represented secret, citing the D.C. Bar rules, the disclosure documents show.”
• “The U.S. Trade Representative office did not respond to ProPublica’s request for comment.”

“OpenAI hit with lawsuit claiming ChatGPT acted as an unlicensed lawyer” —

• “ChatGPT maker OpenAI has been accused in a new lawsuit of practicing law without a U.S. license and helping a former disability claimant breach a settlement and ​flood a federal court docket with meritless filings.”
• “Nippon Life Insurance Company of America alleged on Wednesday in a lawsuit, opens new tab ‌filed in federal court in Chicago that OpenAI wrongfully provided legal assistance to a woman who sought to reopen a lawsuit that was already settled and dismissed.”
• “‘ChatGPT is not an attorney,’ the lawsuit said. Although OpenAI has shown ChatGPT can pass an attorney bar exam, Nippon said, ‘it has not ​been admitted to practice law in the State of Illinois or in any other jurisdiction within the United ​States.'”
• “The lawsuit seeks an order declaring that OpenAI violated Illinois’ unauthorized practice of law statute, as well ⁠as $300,000 in compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive damages.”
• “OpenAI in a statement on Thursday said ‘this complaint lacks any merit whatsoever.'”
• “Nippon claimed OpenAI encouraged the ​woman, an employee of a logistics company that had insurance coverage through Nippon, to press ahead in her already-settled disability case. Nippon said it spent significant time and resources and racked up substantial fees responding to the woman’s ChatGPT-powered filings.”
• “The lawsuit appears to be one of the first cases ​to accuse a major AI developer of engaging in the unauthorized practice of law through a consumer‑facing chatbot.”
• “It comes as the ​technology’s rapid adoption for legal filings has led to mounting AI ‘hallucinations’ in court filings, leading judges to sanction litigants and lawyers for submitting filings ‌with fabricated ⁠case citations or other unverified material produced with generative AI tools.”
  The case stems from filings by the employee after she settled her long‑term disability benefits suit with prejudice in January 2024, according to Nippon. The woman is not a defendant in the lawsuit.”
• “Nippon said the woman last year uploaded an email from her then-lawyer into ChatGPT, which allegedly validated her concerns about the advice she was ​being given. The woman fired ​her lawyer and moved to ⁠reopen her closed case using ChatGPT, the lawsuit said.”
• “A judge denied that bid in February 2025, but Nippon said the plaintiff then filed a new case and dozens of motions and notices ​that the company contends served ‘no legitimate legal or procedural purpose.’ Nippon claims ChatGPT drafted those ​papers.”
• Complaint: here.

And David Kluft notes: “Do we need special rules of procedure for AI?” —

• “The OK Court of Criminal Appeals has adopted a new procedural rule that requires counsel to ‘ensure that any portion of [a] document modified by generative AI … has been verified as accurate by a person.'”
• “The rule also authorizes the court to impose sanctions including waiver of the affected issue on appeal, striking of a non-compliant document and/or contempt. Judge Gary Lumpkin wrote a concurrence to remind everyone that lawyers already had this obligation whether or not AI is used.”
• Order: here.

David Kluft asks: “If a public defender is assigned a conflicting case, but doesn’t know it yet, is his assistance ineffective?”

• “A CO public defender represented a criminal defendant in Matter A. At some point during or before trial in Matter A, the public defender office internally assigned him to Matter B, in which he was to represent another defendant who happened to be a prosecution witness in Matter A.”
• “However, the public defender didn’t yet know about the assignment and didn’t do any work on the matter.”
• “After the defendant in Matter A was convicted, he moved for a new trial based on denial of conflict-free counsel. The CO Ct. of Appeals affirmed – even assuming there was some technical conflict, there was no ‘actual conflict’ for constitutional purposes because the public defender did not ‘actively represent’ the Matter B defendant, and therefore there was no adverse effect on Matter A.”
• “The public defender also represented the Matter A defendant at sentencing, after he did know about Matter B, but the Court found no showing the sentencing was effected by this conflict and it also wasn’t an ‘actual conflict’ because the public defender still hadn’t provided legal services to the Matter B defendant.”
• Decision: here.

“Parties to CT business dispute call for disqualification of former chief justice from case” —

• “One of the parties to a protracted Hartford business dispute wants retired Chief Justice Richard Robinson and his law firm removed from the case for what has been characterized as a violation of a fundamental ethics rule: advising their opponents on Supreme Court strategy in a case over which Robinson presided when it reached the high court on an earlier occasion.”
• “Three partners in the private equity firm CCP Equity Partners have moved to disqualify Robinson and the state’s largest law firm Day Pitney, the latest development in a partnership dispute that has reached the state Supreme and Appellate courts repeatedly over the last 13 years.”
• “Day Pitney represents John Clinton, who sued partners Michael Aspinwall and Steven Piaker and the estate of Lynne P. Young in 2013 over control of the business. Robinson joined Day Pitney after retiring from the Supreme Court in 2024. ‘The facts requiring disqualification are undisputed, extraordinary, and deeply troubling,’ according to the motion by partners Aspinwall, Piaker and the Young estate.”
• “The motion to disqualify Robinson, at this point an allegation, touches upon one of the defining characteristics of the Supreme Court — that discussions among judges when deliberating over decisions are confidential.”
• “In 2022, as chief justice, Robinson led a panel of justices that heard argument and issued a decision the first time the CCP litigation reached the high court. The court ultimately did not rule on the substantive claims in the case. The justices concluded it lacked jurisdiction because the Superior Court had not issued a final decision and returned the matter to the lower court for further proceedings.”
• “The case reached the Supreme Court a second time in 2025, after Robinson had retired and joined Day Pitney. On the second occasion the court ruled on the merits of the case and returned it to the Superior Court for a new trial.”
• “Three justices sat on the panels that heard the case both times. They are Andrew McDonald, Gregory D’Auria and Steven Ecker.”
• “The motion for disqualification raises the possibility that, when the high court heard the case for the first time, Robinson learned, through conferences with fellow justices, their views of the strengths and weaknesses of the arguments. Even if on the first occasion the case was returned the the lower court without a substantive ruling, there likely was preliminary discussion of the merits.”
• “Day Pitney billing records obtained by the partners moving for disqualification show, according to their motion, that within days of beginning work for Day Pitney and ‘before Day Pitney filed its brief in the second appeal, Justice Robinson actively joined the firm’s representation of the Plaintiff in this case and offered advice about appellate tactics and strategy—even helping to draft a motion to transfer the pending appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court over which he once presided.'”
• “‘If Defendants did not see these billing records, they might have never known that Day Pitney has been coached for seventeen months by a Justice who had first hand knowledge of how a majority of the Supreme Court Justices on the 2025 panel once viewed the core contract interpretation issues in this matter. The cat is now out of the bag, and Defendants cannot be required to tolerate this situation,’ the motion asserts.”
• “The motion for disqualification is based on The Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct for lawyers, which say ‘a lawyer shall not represent anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a judge . . . unless all parties to the proceeding give informed consent, confirmed in writing.'”
• “Day Pitney has not yet responded to the potential disqualification in court, which has been set down tentatively for a hearing on March 16. The firm and Robinson did not respond to inquiries.”

“SBM issues ethics opinion on reverse contingent fee agreements” —

• “The State Bar of Michigan’s Standing Committee on Professional Ethics recently issued a new ethics opinion regarding reverse contingent fee arrangements, in which the attorney’s compensation is calculated based on the amount by which the client’s liability is reduced. “
• “Under such an agreement, the lawyer and client agree that the lawyer will receive a percentage of the amount saved by the client. For example, if a tax authority asserts that a client owes $1 million, and the lawyer negotiates a settlement for $400,000, the savings to the client is $600,000. If the fee agreement calls for a one-third reverse contingent fee, the lawyer would be entitled to $200,000. “
• “Reverse contingent fee agreements are typically used in civil defense matters, tax controversies, debt resolution or other situations where a client must pay a sum of money rather than recover one. “
• “Opinion RI-394 outlines the conditions that must be met for a reverse contingent fee arrangement to be considered ethically permissible. Based on RI-394, an appropriate reverse contingent fee must include:
  • A written fee agreement, specifying the method of calculation;
  • Full disclosure and informed consent;
  • A reasonably-assessed baseline;
  • A fee that is not clearly excessive when agreed to, charged, or collected; and
    Written disclosure of the method of calculation at the conclusion of the matter.
• “The full opinion, which references MRPC 1.5, ABA Formal Opinion 93-373, and DC Bar Ethics Opinion 347, elaborates on each one of these conditions. Read the full opinion here.”

“‘Red flags’: Randazzo hid $4.3M at heart of FirstEnergy trial, attorney says” —

• “Sam Randazzo kept people in the dark about a $4.3 million payment at the center of the bribery trial of two former FirstEnergy executives, a former colleague testified on Tuesday. Columbus energy attorney Matt Pritchard said he wasn’t aware of it for some six years, even though he and Randazzo worked together for years representing the same client. And when he eventually saw documentation of the agreements and payments, Pritchard said it was riddled with ‘red flags.'”
• “The genesis and meaning of the $4.3 million payment are crucial in the trial of former FirstEnergy CEO Chuck Jones and top lobbyist Michael Dowling, who are accused of bribing Randazzo shortly before he was appointed chairman of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. “
• “Prosecutors say Jones and Dowling rushed in late 2018 to pay the $4.3 million as a bribe after learning Randazzo would be appointed to the PUCO, which regulates how much utilities like FirstEnergy can make. Randazzo, who died by suicide in 2024, helped push for the scandal-ridden House Bill 6 — a nuclear energy bailout — and regulatory rulings, together, worth more than $1 billion to FirstEnergy, prosecutors say.”
• “Defense attorneys say the payment was a legal settlement meant for Randazzo and Pritchard’s clients. They also said Jones and Dowling wanted to pay out the contract early to get the expenses off FirstEnergy’s books after a particularly successful 2018.”
• “Pritchard said he worked with Randazzo at law firm McNees, Wallace & Nurick since 2011. He helped Randazzo represent IEU-Ohio, a trade group made up of businesses that use large amounts of energy. The attorneys on behalf of IEU-Ohio fought against high prices and large surcharges levied by utilities, including FirstEnergy.”
• “In 2015, Randazzo and Pritchard negotiated a multi-million dollar settlement with FirstEnergy, agreeing they wouldn’t oppose a FirstEnergy surcharge to customers from 2016 to 2019. Pritchard helped work on that settlement.”
• “He said he was ‘confused’ years later when presented with a document that said Randazzo negotiated a $4.3 million settlement extension later in 2015 that called for more pay outs from 2020 to 2024. Pritchard said he learned of the extension after Randazzo’s attorney, Roger Sugarman, asked Pritchard to sign an affidavit about the settlement. Pritchard refused.”
• “Pritchard also said Randazzo kept him and others at the law firm in the dark about a $2.1 million consulting agreement he inked in 2013 with a FirstEnergy subsidiary. He said that was against the law firm’s policy because it presented a conflict of interest.”
• “‘I would only be able to represent one party in a given matter,’ Pritchard said.”
• “Defense attorneys have argued that Randazzo was a thief who stole from his clients, including the $4.3 million settlement.”
• “On cross-examination by Jones’ attorney Jeremy Dunnaback, Pritchard said he became aware that Randazzo stole from other settlements, including those that had more conventional documentation.”

“Alston & Bird Accused of ‘Essential’ Role in Crypto Ponzi Scheme” —

• “Alston & Bird is being sued by investors in Florida who say they were duped into contributing to an alleged $328 million cryptocurrency Ponzi scheme over business relationship contracts drafted by the international law firm.”
• “The purposed class action complaint, filed in the US District Court for the Southern District of Florida, claims that ‘Alston & Bird architected the legal framework through which investor funds and retirement funds were solicited, pooled, transferred, and deployed’ into Goliath Ventures.”
• “Lawsuits have been pouring into Florida state and federal courts from investors claiming to have been fooled by Goliath’s CEO Christopher Alexander Delgado, who’s been charged with wire fraud and money laundering. This week a state court appointed a receiver to protect the investors’ funds.”
• “According to federal prosecutors, Delgado started a legitimate cryptocurrency liquidity business, which uses investor funds to allow for transfer of different crypto assets in a private pool and earns profits from transaction fees. However, most of the funds were never invested in the pool, and millions were allegedly spent on Delgado’s private purchases and real estate.”
• “Thursday’s complaint alleges that Alston & Bird prepared an opinion letter assuring investors that the liquidity pool wouldn’t constitute a security, which would allow Delgado to raise capital from investors and channel that cash through joint venture agreements without triggering regulatory scrutiny and obligations under securities laws.”
• “But this was incorrect advice, and none of the lawyers working on this matter are licensed in Florida, the complaint said.”
• “This triggered ‘a duty owed by Alston & Bird to the partners or joint venturers in the joint venture it created and represented, and then facilitate securities fraud and other misconduct on behalf of one partner against the rest,’ the complaint said.”
• “The firm didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment.”

“‘Four Days Was Enough’ How Filing the Wrong Answer Cost a Law Firm Its Entire Case” —

• “In workers’ compensation litigation, attorneys often move fast. Claims get filed, coverage is investigated, and answers get submitted before all the facts are in. But a new unpublished decision from the New Jersey Appellate Division delivers a stark reminder: moving fast does not excuse moving incorrectly — especially when an ethical duty to a client is on the line.”
• “The case arose from a professional employer organization (PEO) arrangement. Prop N Spoon, a restaurant employer, contracted with Paychex — a national PEO — to administer its HR functions, including workers’ compensation coverage. When employee Johann Mejia Arboleda filed a workers’ compensation claim petition in October 2024, alleging a work-related injury, Prop N Spoon tendered the claim to Paychex. American Zurich Insurance, Paychex’s insurer, assigned Goldberg Segalla LLP as defense counsel.”
• “Here is where things went sideways. The Four-Day Representation”
• “On October 31, 2024, Goldberg Segalla filed a verified answer on behalf of Prop N Spoon. The answer was substantive: it disputed the nature, extent, and causation of Arboleda’s claimed disability; requested his treatment records; reserved all defenses; and preserved the right to cross-examine witnesses and present expert testimony. Nothing in the filing reserved rights or flagged a future conflict. To the court and all others, Goldberg Segalla was Prop N Spoon’s lawyer.”
• “Four days later, on November 4, 2024, Goldberg Segalla filed an amended answer. This time, it entered a special appearance on behalf of Paychex, stated it did not represent Prop N Spoon, and denied coverage of the claim entirely. Shortly thereafter, it moved to dismiss the claim against Paychex, asserting that Prop N Spoon had concealed Arboleda’s employment and thereby forfeited workers’ compensation coverage.”
• “In a span of four days, the firm had gone from defending Prop N Spoon to attacking it.”
• “Prop N Spoon, now forced to hire its own attorney, moved to disqualify Goldberg Segalla under RPC 1.9(a)—New Jersey’s former-client conflict-of-interest rule. That rule prohibits a lawyer who has represented a client from later representing another party in the same matter whose interests are materially adverse to the former client, absent written informed consent.”
• “Goldberg Segalla opposed the motion with a creative argument: there was no attorney-client relationship with Prop N Spoon because the firm never intended to represent it, never provided legal advice, never exchanged confidential information, and — critically — the electronic court filing system left them no choice but to list Prop N Spoon as the client when submitting the initial answer. The firm characterized the filing as a ‘preliminary’ step in the investigative process and emphasized that no substantive proceedings occurred during the four-day window.”
• “The compensation judge was unpersuaded. On May 1, 2025, he disqualified the firm and ordered Zurich and Paychex to retain new counsel. After reconsideration was denied on July 7, 2025, Paychex appealed.”
• “The Appellate Division affirmed, and its reasoning is worth understanding carefully.”
• “The court applied de novo review to the legal question of disqualification under RPC 1.9(a) — meaning it gave no deference to the compensation judge’s legal conclusions and reviewed the rule fresh. That standard actually cut against Goldberg Segalla; the court found the answer just as obvious as the judge did.”
• “The court’s analysis rested on the plain text of RPC 1.9(a). The rule does not ask whether confidential information was exchanged. It does not ask whether the prior representation caused harm. It does not carve out exceptions for brief or unintentional representations. It asks one question: Did the lawyer represent the client in the matter? If yes, and if the current client’s interests are materially adverse to those of the former client, disqualification follows unless there is written, informed consent.”
• “Filing a verified answer on Prop N Spoon’s behalf — one that actively defended the company against Arboleda’s claims — was, in the court’s view, representation. Full stop. The firm undertook Prop N Spoon’s defense. That it did so for only four days before pivoting did not change the analysis; it only underscored how egregious the conflict was.”
• “The court also rejected the ‘no harm, no foul’ framing directly and pointedly: ‘We decline to engraft a ‘no harm-no foul’ standard onto the Rules of Professional Conduct, particularly where, as here, a duty to a client is implicated.’ The Rules of Professional Conduct exist precisely to protect parties who may not even know they are being harmed — and the court refused to let efficiency or industry custom dilute that protection.”
• “As for the defense of the electronic filing system, the court was dismissive. The judge below had already noted the firm could have filed the answer manually from the outset. The Appellate Division agreed: the technology argument did not excuse the ethical lapse. A systemic workaround was available, and the firm did not use it.”
• “Mejia Arboleda v. Paychex is a cautionary tale about the collision of administrative convenience and professional responsibility. The court’s message is unambiguous: the ethics rules are not suggestions, and representing a party — even briefly, even accidentally, even without exchanging a single word of legal advice — carries binding consequences. In workers’ compensation PEO litigation, where the lines of coverage and representation can blur quickly, getting the client identification right from the very first filing is not a technicality. It is an ethical obligation with real teeth.”
• Decision: “Mejia Arboleda v. Paychex & Prop N Spoon, A-0085-25 (N.J. App. Div. Feb. 25, 2026)“

David Kluft asks: “Can I use an AI chatbot for legal marketing and client intake?” —

• “The OR bar has issued an opinion giving ‘qualified’ approval to attorneys’ use of AI chatbots in connection with marketing and intake.”
• “The qualifications include (1) per Rule 1.1, the lawyer must be technically competent with regard to the technology and vendors; (2) per Rule 1.6 and 1.18, the lawyer must protect the confidentiality of information by arranging for it to be encrypted and stored properly; (3) per Rule 5.3, the lawyer must make reasonable efforts to supervise any third party providers who run the chatbot; and (4) per Rule 7.1, lawyers are responsible if the chatbot misleads clients or prospective clients.”
• “In addition, lawyers should be aware that a chatbot’s interaction with a client could inadvertently create an attorney client relationship, so they need to include the appropriate disclaimers and ALSO monitor the chatbot’s interactions with prospective clients to make sure (a) that the interaction did not give the prospective client a reasonable belief that there was an attorney client relationship when that is not what the attorney intends; (b) that the interaction did not trigger a duty of diligence to meet certain case deadlines; and (c) that the interaction did not trigger a duty notify the prospective client that in fact no attorney-client relationship exists.”
• Opinion: Here.

For those noting last week’s Patent examiner conflict story, we now have a response from Director John Squires:

• “…I am directing any Patents employee who participates in deciding the scope of patent rights to affirmatively recuse themselves from examining any application where they hold stock or bonds (publicly traded or privately held) in any of the listed applicants, regardless of the dollar value-rather than the current $15,000 threshold.”
• “Patents employees who participate in deciding the scope of patent rights include patent examiners (inclusive of patent reexamination specialists) and their supervisors when the supervisor is signing or otherwise reviewing (e.g., a streamlined review) an Office action.”
• “This guidance does not alter or amend the application of existing ethical standards to patent examiners or their supervisors. It does not require patent examiners or their supervisors to divest any financial interests (e.g., stocks or bonds), nor does it prohibit them from holding any financial interests.”
• “Let me be clear: nothing in this memorandum is intended to imply or suggest that patent examiners or their supervisors, in any past or pending cases, have been anything but fair, impartial, and acted in good faith. USPTO’s patent examiners are committed to avoiding even an appearance of impropriety, and have pledged not to othe1wise violate any obligations under existing federal ethics regulations and laws.”
• “To ensure that patent examiners, their supervisors, and Patents management are able to make fully informed decisions in examining patent applications, I am herewith requesting that patent examiners, as part of their existing conflict check procedures, voluntarily inform their supervisors of any companies in which they know that they, their spouse, or their minor children own stocks or bonds, regardless of the dollar value of such stocks or bonds. Supervisors of examiners should likewise inform their Technology Center Directors of such information.”
• “I am further directing that if a patent examiner or supervisor later becomes aware-after a case has been docketed or submitted to them-that the examiner or supervisor, or the examiner’s or supervisor’s spouse or minor children, owns any amount of stock or bonds in the applicant, the examiner or supervisor request that the application be reassigned. Patents management shall provide further guidance about the implementation of this memorandum.
  This guidance goes into effect immediately, and will remain in full force and effect until fmther notice.”

David Kluft asks: “Can my expert be disqualified if she spoke to the opposing party without counsel present?” —

• “A group of CA prisoners brought a class action against their prisons over health conditions. Defense counsel facilitated an environmental health expert to conduct an inspection of the facilities, and during the inspection she interviewed four class members without class counsel present.”
• “The defense argued that there was no misconduct because its counsel wasn’t near the expert when she was conducting these interviews and didn’t know they were taking place.”
• “The Court held that these conversations nevertheless violated Rule 4.2, because they were communications by an expert hired by defense counsel with plaintiffs who the defense knew had counsel. As a sanction, the court struck the parts of the expert report that mentioned or relied on these interviews.”
• Ruling: here.

“Trump DOJ Pushes to Sideline State Bar Ethics Investigations” —

• “The Justice Department is seeking to empower Attorney General Pam Bondi to suspend state bar ethics investigations into current and former DOJ lawyers—a step outside attorneys quickly criticized as an illegal intervention into state-run processes.”
• “The proposed regulation, posted in the Federal Register Wednesday, would aim to halt state-level ethics proceedings against DOJ lawyers while the department conducts its own review, which would diminish local bar associations’ power. It comes as Bondi, members of her leadership team, and prosecutors involved in immigration matters face complaints probing DOJ misconduct in states where they’re licensed to practice law.”
• “If finalized after a public comment period, ‘whenever a third party files a bar complaint alleging that a current or former Department attorney violated an ethics rule while engaging in that attorney’s duties for the Department, or whenever bar disciplinary authorities open an investigation into such allegations,’ the attorney general ‘will have the right to review the complaint and the allegations in the first instance,’ the proposal states.”
• “An attorney general who decides to exercise this right—or a designated official—will then notify the state bar agency and the lawyer facing the complaint and ‘request’ that the disciplinary authorities pause the investigation until the review is completed.”
• “If the DOJ finds no violation, that blocks the state from investigating the alleged infraction. And ‘should the relevant bar disciplinary authorities refuse the Attorney General’s request, the Department shall take appropriate action to prevent the bar disciplinary authorities from interfering with the Attorney General’s review of the allegations,’ the proposed regulation states.”
• “Hilary Gerzhoy, chair of the DC Bar rules of professional conduct review committee, said the proposal ‘is incredibly concerning.'”
• “‘It is inconsistent with all precedents, ‘ Gerzhoy said. ‘The way that the DC bar disciplines lawyers is an independent process that happens in the DC Court of Appeals. It is not a federal process.'”
• “Although some attorneys predicted state disciplinary bodies would simply ignore the department’s attempt to intervene, Gerzhoy said she expects state bars to issue statements that ‘will make clear that DOJ does not have standing to promulgate this new rule.'”
• “By moving to establish a new attorney general-run review process for ethics complaints, DOJ would be setting up a potentially duplicative system for handling allegations of employee violations. The department’s Office of Professional Responsibility is already tasked with reviewing complaints of prosecutors or other lawyers breaching their professional duties and can make recommendations to another DOJ internal disciplinary body.”
• “‘This is about DOJ interfering with the states’ licensing authority of lawyers for the political benefit of this administration’ and ‘DOJ attempting to identify those who complain about DOJ attorneys and potentially target them,’ said Kevin Owen, a partner at Gilbert Employment Law who represents whistleblowers and others raising allegations of department wrongdoing. ‘This is going to have a chilling effect on appropriate complaints about DOJ attorney misconduct.'”

“When Advocacy and Ethics Collide: Two Recent North Carolina Decisions on Attorney Disqualification” —

• “Two recent North Carolina decisions, Sloan‑Oudeh v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2026) and WP Church, LLC v. Whalen (2026 NCBC Order 10) offer timely and instructive guidance on attorney disqualification, underscoring the judiciary’s increasing willingness to enforce ethical boundaries even when doing so disrupts ongoing litigation. Although arising in different contexts, both cases emphasize that courts will closely scrutinize counsel’s role when representation threatens to blur the line between advocate, witness, or conflicted fiduciary.”
• “Sloan‑Oudeh v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2026) Rule 3.7 and the Lawyer as Necessary Witness”
• “In Sloan‑Oudeh, the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the disqualification of plaintiff’s counsel under Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, concluding that counsel was ‘likely to be a necessary witness’ in an insurance bad‑faith case. The court emphasized that the plaintiff herself lacked direct knowledge of many key communications and negotiations, which had been handled almost entirely by her attorney. Because those communications went to contested issues such as bad faith, unfair trade practices, and punitive damages, the attorney’s testimony could not be avoided or characterized as collateral. Importantly, the Court rejected arguments that disqualification would cause substantial hardship, noting advance notice, the availability of other attorneys within the firm, and counsel’s long‑standing awareness that he might be called as a witness.”
• “WP Church, LLC v. Whalen (2026 NCBC Order 10) Dual Representation and Non‑Consentable Conflicts”
• “The North Carolina Business Court’s decision in WP Church v. Whalen addresses a different, however equally significant ethical concern: whether a law firm may simultaneously represent a company and its manager when derivative claims allege serious self‑dealing and misappropriation. The court held that such dual representation was impermissible where the allegations went well beyond mere mismanagement and included detailed claims of fraud, theft, and conflicted transactions exceeding $5 million. Applying Rules 1.7 and 1.13, the court found that informed consent could not cure the conflict, particularly where the allegedly conflicted manager effectively controlled the entity and where disinterested approval was lacking. The court ordered disqualification sua sponte and struck all filings made on behalf of the company by conflicted counsel.”
• “Together, these decisions are noteworthy for what they signal to the legal profession. Courts are not treating disqualification as a purely tactical remedy or a theoretical ethical concern; rather, they are prepared to intervene decisively where counsel’s continued involvement threatens trial integrity, client interests, or public confidence in the process. Both opinions stress that advance planning, internal firm firewalls, and consent letters may not suffice when the substance of the lawyer’s role, or the severity of alleged misconduct, creates an unavoidable conflict.”
• “For practitioners, the implications are clear. Lawyers who become deeply embedded in the factual narrative of a dispute risk becoming indispensable witnesses, even in civil and insurance litigation, where such outcomes are often underestimated. Likewise, firms representing closely held companies or LLCs must carefully evaluate dual representation at the outset of disputes involving fiduciary allegations, particularly in derivative actions. These cases serve as a reminder that ethical compliance is not merely a professional obligation; it is a strategic imperative that can determine who gets to stay in the courtroom and who does not.”

“Patent Examiner Pays $500K for Financial Conflicts — But the Real Story may be Systemic” —

• “A USPTO patent examiner has agreed to pay $500,000 to resolve allegations that she examined patent applications from companies in which she held substantial stock positions. The settlement, announced by the Department of Justice on February 25, 2026, resolves allegations against Daxin Wu, who allegedly worked on at least nine patent applications submitted by companies in which she held financial interests between January 2019 and May 2022. The dollar amounts are striking. Wu allegedly reviewed applications for companies in which she owned more than $300,000 and $140,000 worth of stock, respectively. She also allegedly reviewed applications from commercial competitors of a company in which she held more than $900,000 in stock. These holdings dwarf the regulatory de minimis thresholds that permit patent examiners to hold limited stock positions in companies whose applications they review. Under 5 C.F.R. § 2640.202, an examiner may hold up to $15,000 in stock in a single company whose application they are reviewing, or up to $25,000 in aggregate across companies within the industry sector covered by their art unit. Wu’s alleged holdings exceeded these thresholds by orders of magnitude.”
• “The Wu case did not emerge from a vacuum. Two years ago, the Commerce Department’s Office of Inspector General issued a report concluding that the USPTO and the Department of Commerce ‘did not effectively administer the Department’s ethics program to protect against potential conflicts of interest by patent examiners.’ U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Office of Inspector General, The Department Needs to Strengthen Its Ethics Oversight for USPTO Patent Examiners, Final Report No. OIG-24-013-I (Feb. 14, 2024). That report, triggered by hotline referrals, found systemic failures at every level of the ethics oversight process. The OIG sampled 73 examiners and found that 26 had potential financial conflicts that ethics officials failed to identify. Projecting those results across the roughly 7,000 examiners required to file confidential financial disclosure reports, the OIG estimated that approximately 2,100 patent examiners (about 30%) had potential financial conflicts that went undetected in calendar year 2022.”
• “The Wu settlement appears to be the first public enforcement action arising from those referrals. The OIG report noted that it ‘referred potential violations of law ‘ to the Office of Investigations. The timeline aligns: Wu’s alleged conduct covers 2019 through May 2022, and the hotline referrals began arriving in March 2022. The investigation then took roughly four years to produce yesterday’s civil settlement.”

“Trump’s first solicitor general turns on him in $5 billion JPMorgan ‘debanking’ case” —

• “He developed a reputation as a battler for difficult causes. Against all odds, he managed to defend the so-called ‘Muslim ban’ at the Supreme Court. No wonder he is in demand since becoming a partner at Jones Day. Court filings obtained by [Washington Examiner] Secrets show that he is one of the lawyers defending JPMorgan Chase and Jamie Dimon, its chief executive, against accusations that it ‘debanked’ a client for his political beliefs. That client is his former boss.”
• “Francisco may once have been the fourth-highest ranking lawyer in the Trump administration but now he is the latest figure to have switched sides. Along with his firm, which earned millions of dollars from the 2016 Trump campaign, he provided dozens of lawyers for the administration, which took his side as the then-president fought to overturn the 2020 election.”
• “‘There is no other legal firm more clearly aligned with Trump personally and the wider MAGA movement in general,’ said a Secrets legal source. ‘They revel in it.'”
• “Trump’s allies are fuming. They accuse Jones Day of a conflict of interest and claim that lawyers such as Francisco have intimate insider knowledge of the Trump legal playbook, which they say should be kept far from the case.”
• “‘Isn’t there a conflict of interest given that the President has been represented by Jones Day??’ posted Laura Loomer, the rightwing influencer, who was the first to ask the question.”
• “Trump is suing the bank and its CEO for $5 billion. But it is the names of the lawyers in the court filings that have particularly rankled in Trumpworld, where loyalty is everything.”
• “Other filings last week spotlighted Francisco as one of the lawyers on the case. The name of another key player will also ring bells with longtime Trump watchers: Eliot Pedrosa was plucked from Jones Day in 2018 for a top role with the Inter-American Development Bank, pushing the administration’s hard-line anti-socialist policy in the region. Now he is back with the firm and working against his former boss.”
• “Jones Day inserted itself deeply into the first Trump administration, providing a string of key staff for the White House and Justice Department, and then representing the Trump campaign in suits around the 2020 election.”
• “Mike Davis, a former legal adviser to Trump, said he was shocked that it had taken a case against Trump. ‘The law firm Jones Day, which represented Trump, is now adverse to him in the JPMorgan debanking lawsuit, he told Steve Bannon’s War Room. ‘They know his mindset, strengths, weaknesses, negotiation limits, and confidential information. Taking an adverse client puts them on very treacherous ethical ground.'”
• “That still allows sufficient room for Jones Day to represent JP Morgan, said Cassandra Robertson, a law professor at Case Western Reserve University, unless the firm had previously worked on a matter closely related to this case.”
• “Nor was it enough to say that the firm or figures such as Francisco had insider understanding of the Trump legal strategy in order to get them thrown off the case.”
• “‘That would be called the playbook strategy in legal ethics terms, that somebody represented a party long enough to know their entire legal playbook, which then would be potentially disadvantageous,’ she said.”
• “‘That was kind of a popular theory of conflicts, maybe 20 or 30 years ago,’ Robertson said. ‘At this point, most courts have said that the idea of a playbook conflict is not enough.'”

“Court slashes lawyers’ $510M contingency fee in $10B Robinson Huron settlement to $40M” —

• “The Ontario Superior Court has slashed legal fees for the lawyers who obtained a $10-billion settlement for certain First Nations under the Robinson Huron treaty, reducing their compensation from $510 million to $40 million.”
• “In Nootchtai v. Nahwegahbow Corbiere Genoodmagejig Barristers and Solicitors, 2025 ONSC 6071, released on Oct. 29, Justice Fred Myers ruled that the $510-million claimed by counsel based on a partial contingency fee agreement would amount to a windfall of huge fees unrelated to the value of services rendered.”
• “‘A lawyer’s professional retainer is not a lottery ticket offering a bonus prize of generational wealth to the lawyers if the clients hit the jackpot and win a mega-award,’ the judge wrote.”
• “In June 2023, the Crown agreed to pay $10 billion to settle claims brought by Robinson Huron Treaty First Nations for breach of the 1850 Robinson Huron treaty. Under the treaty, the Crown agreed to make annual payments to the First Nations and their members in perpetuity, with the amount to increase over time as revenues from the territory grew.”
• “However, the annuities were frozen at $4 per person for almost 150 years in what the Supreme Court described as ‘a mockery of the Crown’s treaty promise to the Anishinaabe of the upper Great Lakes.'”
• “The six-member legal team for the First Nations claimed $510 million as fees under a partial contingency fee agreement.”
• “In April 2024, the chiefs and trustees of the Robinson Huron Treaty Litigation Fund voted to approve the legal team’s proposed $510-million fee after the lawyers offered to gift back half to the fund. The legal team was subsequently paid $255 million.”
• “Two of the 21 First Nations opposed approval of the fees.”
• “The applicants — Gimaa (Chief) Craig Nootchtai on his own behalf, and on behalf of Atikameksheng Anishnawbek First Nation, and Ogimaa Kwe (Chief) Karen Bell and Councillor Chester Langille on their own behalf, and on behalf of Garden River First Nation — sought a review of the legal fees.”
• “They submitted that the fees must be reduced despite approval by the fund trustees and chiefs as they were too high.”
• “Justice Myers noted that the issue before the court was whether the $510-million fee claimed by the legal team under a 2011 partial contingency fee agreement was fair and reasonable or if it amounted to unlawful ‘champerty.'”
• “Champerty is the purchase of a stake in a lawsuit without a legitimate interest in the case, and is illegal in Ontario.”
• “Under the 2011 agreement, the six-lawyer legal team agreed to bill at 50 per cent of their normal hourly rates in exchange for a contingent success fee of 15 per cent on the first $100 million recovered and five per cent on any amount above that. The agreement did not, however, cap the total fee and also required the First Nations to fund all disbursements.”
• “The legal team also engaged roughly 40 other lawyers, all of whom billed the fund at their standard hourly rates.”
• “‘As a result of the leverage employed by the Legal Team, using juniors and others (including at least one Queen’s Counsel) all billing at full fees, the 50 per cent discount on the fees of the members the Legal Team did not amount to a 50 per cent discount on the cost of the litigation,’ Justice Myers noted.”
• “The court observed that the discount on the hourly rates of the legal team amounted to about a 25 per cent discount on the $23 million billed by all the lawyers working for the legal team. ‘With disbursements of another $6.5 million paid by the clients, the Fund was bearing over 80 per cent of the financial load of the litigation,’ the judge wrote.”
• “The court also observed that the chiefs of the First Nations involved and their negotiating committee did not consult independent counsel about the risks and benefits of the contingency fee agreement. Justice Myers also noted that the legal team did not suggest or insist that the fund or the chiefs obtain independent legal advice.”
• “The judge found that the chiefs did not fully appreciate the nature of the agreement and believed that the deal was in return for the lawyers bearing 50 per cent of the projected litigation cost.”
• “Justice Myers calculated that dividing the $510,000,000 by 65,000 hours would yield an average hourly billable rate of more than $7,800 per hour, or about $3,900 per hour if the court considered $255 million as the amount claimed for legal fees.”
• “‘Those rates would be a windfall that bear no relationship at all to the chargeable value of legal services in Ontario whether in 2007 or today,’ the judge wrote.”
• “The judge cited Fresco v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 2024 ONCA 628, in which the Ontario Court of Appeal observed that lawyers charging excessive fees beyond what is fair and reasonable undermines the integrity of the legal profession.”
• “Justice Myers noted that the amount of the settlement in the case at bar was so big that the percentage recovery guideline often used in contingency fee review must be discarded to avoid an unseemly, disproportionate, champertous windfall to the lawyers.”