“No Conflict Where Adverse Witness Paid Defendant’s Legal Fees” —

• “The New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief to a defendant convicted of murder who claimed a conflict of interest.”
  • “In this opinion we afford substantial discussion as to one of those claims: whether defendant’s representation was compromised because his coparent and girlfriend, who was called at trial as a fact witness for the State, paid for the legal fees of his private criminal defense attorney. Defendant alleges the fee arrangement created an untenable conflict of interest.”
  • “For the reasons that follow, we affirm the PCR court’s determination that defendant was not deprived of effective representation of his counsel, who represented him zealously at trial. In particular, defense counsel vigorously cross examined the witness, who had paid his fees, about certain incriminating statements she made regarding defendant to police detectives.”
  • “Under New Jersey’s Rules of Professional Conduct (the “RPCs”), “lawyer[s] shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless: (1) the client gives informed consent; (2) there is no interference with the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment or with the lawyer-client relationship; and (3) information relating to representation of a client is protected.” RPC 1.8(f).”
  • “As the PCR court found, Boone did not direct or interfere with defendant’s counsel’s representation of his client. Nor is there evidence she communicated with his counsel concerning the substance of the case. As described by Boone in her testimony, she had three meetings with counsel at the outset of his work to discuss and arrange payment, and that was essentially the end of their contact. No billing disputes or payment problems were identified. And defendant’s counsel had no attorney-client relationship with Boone. To the contrary, as the PCR court found, defendant’s counsel recommended Boone secure her own attorney to represent her interests—which she did.”
  • “As to the first condition concerning defendant’s informed consent, we acknowledge the record contains no documentation of such express consent. Defendant alleges in his petition that counsel “never advised him or sought a waiver” of a potential conflict. Because defendant’s counsel is now deceased, the veracity of that claim cannot realistically be disproved. But we decline to hinge a finding of a per se conflict and constitutional violation upon such a ‘bald assertion.'”
  • ‘We take judicial notice it is not unusual that a defendant’s family and friends will pay a private defense lawyer’s fees to represent a loved one or close acquaintance who is accused of a crime. Such private defense counsel perform a vital institutional role in supplementing the services provided by the Office of the Public Defender to clients who personally cannot afford counsel. In a few instances, as here, that payer may also be a potential fact witness for the State at the ensuing criminal trial. We discern no per se constitutional prohibition on such fee arrangements if they are disclosed and with the assent of the defendant and where the counsel’s vigorous representation of the client is not being materially limited by the payer.’

“Firm Can’t Enforce Unexplained Arbitration Clause In Illinois” —

• “A Missouri attorney accused of botching an injury lawsuit he helped pursue for a couple whose dry-cleaning business used allegedly toxic chemicals cannot arbitrate those allegations because he never explained the contractual arbitration provision in those clients’ contract to them, an Illinois state appellate panel has found.”
• “In a published opinion Friday, a three-judge panel said Humphrey Farrington & McClain PC and shareholder Andrew Smith’s failure to fully inform former Wisconsin clients Bryan and Karen Dick-Ipsen about the meaning and consequences of the firm’s arbitration provision is ‘critical’ to its finding that a trial court correctly found the clause procedurally unconscionable.”
• “‘Based on the evidence … it is clear that plaintiff was neither apprised of the advantages and disadvantages of arbitration nor was given sufficient information by defendants to permit him to make an informed decision about whether to agree to the arbitration provision,’ the panel said. ‘Defendants submitted no evidence to the contrary.'”
• “Smith and his firm argued that the arbitration provision was enforceable because the Federal Arbitration Act preempts conflicting state law ethical rules, including Illinois’ Rules of Professional Conduct. The panel said the rules of professional conduct do not make the arbitration provision procedurally unconscionable themselves, but rather provide guidance on existing attorney conduct standards ‘and serve as a lens through which we can review the circumstances of the contract formation to decide whether enforcing an arbitration provision would be unconscionable.'”
• “The defendants drafted the arbitration provision at issue but didn’t discuss it with Bryan Dick-Ipsen, who has Parkinson’s disease and sought their help pursuing claims against those who injured him, though they discussed other contractual terms including their fee and scope of work, the panel said. Smith and the firm ‘made no effort’ to discuss the arbitration provision’s terms and implications, or all of the rights and benefits Dick-Ipsen would be waiving by agreeing to it, the panel said.”
• “Dick-Ipsen was only a prospective client at the time, but Smith and his firm were still in a position of trust under which they owed him certain ethical duties, the panel said.”
• “‘The totality of the circumstances shows that plaintiff cannot fairly be said to have been aware that he was agreeing to waive several rights by agreeing to arbitrate any potential claim for legal malpractice.'”
• “The defendants argued Dick-Ipsen’s affidavit proves that he had several days to read and review his contract terms, but he also submitted uncontradicted evidence that he didn’t understand the arbitration provision enough to agree to it, the panel said. That wouldn’t be enough to render the provision unenforceable in a standard contract case, but Dick-Ipsen cannot be held to the same standard given his specific circumstances, the parties’ sophistication gap ‘and the unique aspects of the attorney-client relationship,’ the panel said.”

“Gibson Dunn Takes US Gymnast Chiles’ Medal Fight to Swiss Court” —

• “Gibson Dunn & Crutcher is representing US Olympic gymnast Jordan Chiles as she tries to win back a bronze medal from the 2024 Paris games.”
• “Chiles was stripped of her medal by a Court of Arbitration for Sport ruling last month after a challenge by the Romanian Gymnastics Federation. Gibson Dunn and Zurich-headquartered firm Homburger AG on Monday filed an appeal in the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland, seeking to overturn that decision.”
• “The appeal also argues the ruling suffered from a conflict of interest. Hamid Gharavi, the president of the arbitration panel that revoked the medal and awarded it to a Romanian, was actively representing Romania at the time of the case, according to the lawyers.”
• “Chiles’ legal team also plans to file an additional petition seeking alternative relief from the Swiss Federal Supreme Court. The appeals could result in a retrial allowing Chiles to prepare a defense and present evidence, the statement said.”
• See also: “New documentary footage may provide crucial video evidence for Jordan Chiles to reclaim Olympic bronze medal“