Bressler Risk Blog

Why law firm risk leaders receive recognition, it’s worth noting — Congrats, Robyn! — “DLA Piper shortlisted for five Financial Times 2025 North America Innovative Lawyer awards” —

• “Finally, Robyn Spanier, the firm’s Executive Director of New Business Intake and Procurement, was shortlisted in the Innovation in Strategic Direction category for her role revolutionizing the firm’s new business intake process, leading to market-leading turnaround times for running conflict searches and processing new matters.”
• “This year’s North America Innovative Lawyer awards ceremony will be held in New York on December 8.”

“Chris Cuomo Loses Appeal Bid to Disqualify Arbitrator in CNN Proceedings” —

• “Chris Cuomo can’t revive his bid to disqualify the arbitrator overseeing his $125 million claim against CNN, a New York appeals court has ruled.”
• “The court found that Cuomo ‘did not set forth facts to indicate that the arbitrator was biased in his handling of the arbitration.’ He had initiated the proceedings after he was fired by CNN in 2021 after a deposition revealed he gave advice to his brother, former New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo, who was accused of sexual harassment.”
• “Cuomo’s lawyers had moved to remove JAMS arbitrator Stephen Sonnenberg because he failed to disclose four CNN-related matters that his former law firm handled when he worked at Paul Hastings. He was also personally involved in a 2003 case involving the network, though he said he had no recollection of the matter.”
• “In the order, issued on Tuesday, the court stressed that Cuomo’s lawyers had no issue with the 39 orders issued so far in the arbitration. ‘Nor did counsel claim there was any misconduct on the part of the arbitrator, and was willing to proceed with the arbitration, but only if a new arbitrator was selected by the parties,’ the ruling stated. ‘However, an arbitrator may not be disqualified solely because of his relationship to a party, but rather, upon facts demonstrating partiality to a litigant.'”
• “Cuomo’s bid for discovery to explore Sonnenberg’s recollection of the CNN case he was involved in was properly denied since it was grounded in speculation that he wasn’t honest, the appeals court concluded. It also pointed to Sonnenberg handling the case more than 20 years ago and that his firm was only paid $3,000 in legal fees.”
• “Cuomo had been with CNN since 2013, first as the anchor of its morning show New Day, and then as a primetime host, where he would often have more of a ‘take’ on the day’s news. In the early weeks and months of the pandemic, he also hosted his older brother on his CNN program, with Zucker and Gollust’s blessing, despite there being a ban on such interviews since 2013. He currently hosts a show on rival cable outlet NewsNation.”

“When Disclosure Becomes Disqualification: Management of Arbitrator Disclosure in MTCC No. 1251 v Windsor Arms” —

• “The appearance of arbitrator bias has been a topic of significant interest in recent years, as well as significant concern given the risks it poses. As a result, any case law that handles new or uncommon factual applications of this issue will be of interest to readers.”
• “One recent example is MTCC No. 1251 v Windsor Arms Hotel Corp., 2025 ONSC 5009, where the Ontario Superior Court considered the issue of an arbitrator having an unrelated matter referred to them by a party’s expert witness, as well as the arbitrator’s handling of the potential appearance of a conflict of interest once it arose. While the Court acknowledged that a single business referral may not be sufficient grounds for disqualification, the arbitrator’s subsequent handling of the conflict created an undeniable perception of partiality. Below, we review the decision.”
• “Roughly 30 hours before the hearing was set to begin, the arbitrator emailed the parties to disclose a ‘clear appearance of conflict.’ The conflict stemmed from the fact that the Tax Expert had recently referred an unrelated litigation matter to the arbitrator’s law firm, and the arbitrator himself had been tasked with ‘preparing the pleadings and assuming carriage of it.’ The arbitrator advised that he had no prior dealings with the Tax Expert, and that no discussions had occurred with respect to his involvement in the arbitration.[3]”
• “The arbitrator’s email presented three options to resolve the conflict: (1) his resignation, (2) a written waiver from both parties, or (3) the exclusion of the Tax Expert’s evidence with a corresponding adjournment to allow MTCC 1251 to retain a new expert. The next day, counsel for Windsor Arms asked the arbitrator to elaborate, taking the position that there was no conflict.”
• “Counsel also suggested a fourth option that the Arbitrator did not mention: ‘the client [who had been referred to the Arbitrator’s firm] could retain someone else and [the Arbitrator] would no longer act.’ In response, the arbitrator reiterated his position, advising that he was content to proceed with the arbitration provided that ‘everyone signs off in one way or another about what might be perceived to be a conflict of interest.'”
• “On the day the hearing was scheduled to begin, MTCC 1251 declined to waive the conflict. Windsor Arms, however, took the position that there was no conflict and the arbitration should proceed. The arbitrator then reversed his position, stating that because Windsor Arms objected to him withdrawing (in other words, because there was no agreement between the parties that his withdrawal was necessary), he would no longer resign. In a series of subsequent emails, the arbitrator suggested the arbitration could and should still proceed, prompting MTCC 1251 to bring a formal motion (within the arbitral process) for his removal. The arbitrator heard the motion and determined that there was no conflict. Consequently, MTCC 1251 commenced an Application in the Superior Court of Justice.”
• “The sole issue before the Court was whether the circumstances gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, a standard set out in s. 13(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, which provides that a court may remove an arbitrator where circumstances exist that may give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.”
• “The Court, after a de novo review of the facts and the applicable law, concluded that the apprehension of bias was reasonable and that the arbitrator should be disqualified. The Court agreed with the arbitrator that in many cases, a single business referral might not be sufficient for removal; however, in this particular case, the arbitrator’s subsequent conduct following his initial disclosure – when considered in its entirety – gave rise to a reasonable apprehension. The Court identified seven key events in support of this conclusion.”
• “Although Windsor Arms does not necessarily raise a novel issue of law, it does emphasize how the management of an arbitrator’s disclosure, rather than the subject matter of the disclosure itself, can be determinative on a test for reasonable apprehension of bias, and that such management can colour events normal to the arbitration process in such a manner that they are construed in a different light.”
• “Most obviously, the arbitrator’s own assessment of their disclosure carries significant weight. The arbitrator’s initial declaration of a ‘clear appearance of conflict’ was not merely a disclosure; rather, it was a determinative self-assessment by the person with the fullest knowledge of the facts. The arbitrator’s reversal on this point was, unsurprisingly, fundamentally impactful to the test for apprehension of bias.”
• “On the other hand, however, the arbitrator was placed in a somewhat invidious position in that his non-disclosure of his communications with the Tax Expert, while relevant to the Court’s analysis, appeared to be the correct approach with respect to the preservation of privilege. It might have been possible for the arbitrator to seek the unrelated client’s waiver of that privilege in order to permit the disclosure of those communications, but there would have been no guarantee that the client would agree to such a request. Furthermore, given the abbreviated timeline of events, this might simply not have been logistically possible in the time available.”
• “Similarly, the exclusion of the clients from the case conference – which is generally unremarkable in normal circumstances – was instead determined to be an additional factor that exacerbated the apprehension of bias. Evidently, procedural decisions – even if standard – must be weighed against the specific circumstances of the parties and the situation at hand.”
• “By contrast, it is equally important to highlight the Court’s emphasis that a single business referral might not be grounds for disqualification. As we have written elsewhere, serving as an arbitrator is an inherently commercial endeavour, and so too is maintaining a practice as counsel at the same time. In such circumstances, it is entirely possible that these two spheres may overlap – particularly in specialized industries – such that professional relationships and business referrals may exist between participants in an arbitration.”
• “Ultimately, Windsor Arms perhaps speaks most directly to the challenge of managing disclosures for arbitrators wearing more than one hat – i.e. maintaining a counsel practice while practicing as an arbitrator (and in some circumstances, an expert witness practice as well). Ultimately, arbitrators and counsel will need to remain mindful not only of the need for disclosure, but of the manner in which such disclosures are managed as well.”

“Atty-Trustee Conflicts Doom Scaife Estate’s $26M Tax Refund” —

• “A Strassburger McKenna Gutnick & Gefsky attorney was also acting as Mellon heir Richard Scaife’s lawyer, trustee and media executive when he signed releases that kept Scaife’s spending of his inheritance secret from his children, so a resulting $200 million settlement between the children and Scaife’s estate was not a bona fide tax-exempt expense, a Pennsylvania appeals court ruled Tuesday.”
• “Citing the apparent conflicts of interest from attorney H. Yale Gutnick’s multiple hats, a three-judge Commonwealth Court panel said the agreements indemnifying the trustees that Scaife signed every time he withdrew money from a family trust were not presumptively valid. Scaife’s estate therefore could not claim the $200 million the trustees paid to replenish the account as an expense of the estate and claim a $26 million refund on state inheritance taxes.”
• “‘Conflicts of interest and fiduciary duties abound in the numerous and layered transactions underlying this matter. Those transactions, in the end, resulted in a several-hundred-million-dollar liability of the estate, the complete absolvement of the trustees of any liability for distributions, and the payment to attorney Gutnick’s law firm of approximately $1.6 million in attorneys’ fees,’ Commonwealth Court Judge Patricia McCullough wrote in the panel’s opinion. ‘Although we cannot divine whether these results were intended by decedent, we must agree with the Westmoreland County Orphans’ Court’s determination that the estate has not succeeded in removing them from suspicion’s reach.'”
• “Scaife had been a beneficiary of a trust that his mother, Sarah Mellon Scaife, had established in 1935, with any children he would have as ‘remainder beneficiaries.’ The trustees of that fund, including Gutnick, allowed Scaife to make 19 withdrawals from the trust between 1996 and his 2014 death, each time without seeking court approval — allegedly to hide the distributions from his children, David and Jennie, the Commonwealth Court said.”
• “To protect themselves, the trustees had Scaife sign agreements each time indemnifying them from any consequences of the withdrawals, which eventually drained all $400 million from the trust to support Scaife’s media holdings.”
• “Upon discovering that the trust had been drained and left nothing for them, David Scaife and Jennie Scaife’s estate sued the trustees. They reached a $200 million settlement in early 2020, and the trustees sought to have that deducted from the value of Scaife’s estate for state and federal inheritance taxes.”
• “But in order for an estate’s liabilities based on promises or agreements to be deductible, the deals need to be genuine or ‘bona fide’ and made in consideration for money or something worth money.”
• “In oral arguments in February, Gutnick’s attorney David Strassburger told the panel that the indemnifications were bona fide agreements between Scaife and the trustees, since Scaife got the ‘consideration’ of not having to go through the courts to access the money.”
• “But the Commonwealth Court said Tuesday the agreements were not genuine, because Gutnick had conflicts of interest in getting Scaife to sign them. Gutnick had been a personal friend Scaife’s; his personal and business attorney; trustee of multiple trusts, including the 1935 trust and other parts of the family fortune; executor of Scaife’s estate; and a board member and president of Scaife’s newspaper companies.”
• “Scaife had not had an outside attorney review the indemnification agreements before signing them, and Gutnick got both the benefit of indemnification and the money going to the media companies he helped run for Scaife, the opinion said.”
• “‘Both the execution and postmortem enforcement of the indemnification agreements clearly were born of a multi-layered confidential relationship between decedent and attorney Gutnick that implicated the array of attorney Gutnick’s significant and potentially conflicting professional and fiduciary duties,’ the opinion said. ‘As a matter of law, then, the indemnification agreements, in this context, are presumptively voidable.'”

“Musk Atty Alex Spiro Faces DQ Bid Ahead Of Twitter Deal Trial” —

• “A certified class of former Twitter investors accusing Elon Musk of tanking the social media platform’s stock during acquisition negotiations has urged a California federal judge to disqualify Musk’s proposed lead trial counsel Alex Spiro before a January trial, arguing he’s a ‘critical first-hand witness’ and may testify, according to documents unsealed Monday.”
• “In a motion filed Sept. 26 and partially unsealed Monday, the investors argue Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP partner Alex Spiro’s possible direct involvement in key events surrounding the billionaire’s $44 billion acquisition of Twitter in 2022 makes him a key witness, creating a conflict under the advocate-witness rule.”
• “The investors argue allowing Spiro to represent Musk at trial when he may also be called to the stand would create a ‘grave risk of jury confusion, make a mockery out of these proceedings and inflict serious prejudice on plaintiffs.'”
• “They added that even if Spiro agrees to testify, that would still create confusion, and the investors say Spiro has been almost entirely absent from the litigation, appearing only via videoconference, while his colleagues have handled the case for years.”
• “In the investors’ latest motion, they argue that in recent years, Spiro and former banker Jared Birchall helped manage Musk’s financial, business and legal affairs, and helped Musk obtain counsel. Musk failed to timely file reports with regulators after he acquired a 9% stake in Twitter between January and March 2022.”
• “Spiro was Musk’s business adviser and helped him organize his unsolicited pursuit of Twitter in April 2022, serving as the direct supervisor for the work Morgan Stanley and Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP were doing for Musk, the motion said.”
• “The investors argued that at trial they plan to show Musk used Twitter’s estimate of the number of spam accounts as a pretext to exit or renegotiate his obligations to acquire Twitter for $54.20 per share, and in light of his purported role as an adviser to Musk, Spiro likely has ‘unique and highly relevant knowledge’ about those issues, the motion said.”
• “Further complicating matters, the investors said, Spiro was so ‘enmeshed’ with the key events of the case that there is the ‘perplexing likelihood that Spiro himself will cross-examine a number of witnesses about their 2022 interactions with him.'”
• “The investors added that ultimately Spiro is a seasoned trial lawyer who narrates extensively when examining witnesses and who has his own media presence, ‘all of which greatly enhances the risk that he will take advantage of his skills and notoriety to cross-contaminate witness testimony and advocacy.'”
• “A hearing on the motion to disqualify is set for Oct. 31 before Judge Breyer, on the same day he is set to hear arguments on the motions for summary judgment.”

“Law Firms’ Trump Deals Escape NY Lawyer Ethics Investigation” —

• “A disciplinary body for New York lawyers is putting off an ethics probe into major law firms’ deals with President Donald Trump. A New York Supreme Court committee last month declined to take up a complaint against nine firms that pledged nearly $1 billion in free legal services to White House in exchange for the removal of administrative probes and punishments, according to documents obtained by Bloomberg Law. The complaint, filed by a group of law professors, accused the firms of violating ethics rules by ‘capitulating’ to Trump’s ‘bullying.'”
• “‘The business decisions of law firms, such as the selection of clients or the allocation of pro bono resources, generally fall outside the purview of this Committee,’ Jorge Dopico, chief attorney for the committee, said in a Sept. 2 letter.”
• “Those deals became a flashpoint of criticism for some of the country’s largest and most powerful law firms. Paul Weiss was the first to reach an agreement after it was the subject of an executive order. The other firms made deals to avoid that fate and to resolve investigations into their diversity programs.”
• “The court’s attorney grievance committee plans to ‘defer further investigation,’ Dopico said in the letter. He did not immediately respond to a request for comment.”
• “Four law firms hit by executive orders over their ties to certain attorneys and cases sued the Trump administration, winning injunctions. The orders—against Perkins Coie, Jenner & Block, Susman & Godfrey, and WilmerHale—blocked lawyers’ access to government buildings, revoked security clearances, and threatened their clients’ government contracts.”
• “The professors’ complaint alleges the firms that made deals with Trump violated their duty to maintain the independence of the legal profession. They also engaged in bribery and extortion by giving the president ‘a ‘war chest’ worth nearly a billion dollars to spend as he pleases on his favorite political causes,’ according to the professors.”
• “Although the firms ‘are the victims of the illegality, they nevertheless had a choice to either litigate, as other firms did, or pay the bribes,’ the professors said in the complaint. ‘They chose to be extorted and pay the bribes.'”
• “The professors have asked the grievance committee to reconsider its decision, arguing that it can ask the firms to produce documents and testify under oath regarding the deals.”
• “‘The very existence of an investigation will inform the Respondents, the President, other firms that might find themselves in his crosshairs, and ultimately the public at large, that New York’s Attorney Grievance Committee is serious about protecting the independence of the legal profession and the sanctity of the rule of law,’ the law professors wrote.”
• “The complaint did not seek discipline for any individual lawyer at the firms. Instead, it sought a public censure or an order requiring the firms to ‘cease and desist from further compliance with the commitments they made.'”

Update (October 30, 2025):​ Thanks to our sponsor, copies of the survey report are now available free from Epiq. For more information, see this post. (Copies remain available directly as well, as noted below.)

Now in its fourth year, the 2025 Law Firm Risk Staffing Compensation Survey report is hot off the presses! (And also now on file with the US Copyright Office.) If you took the survey, please watch for your reports/benchmarks via email today!

The 2025 exercise built on past year’s exercises in some new and interesting ways. (Yes, New York, you got your local spotlight! And everyone should find the new percentile metrics helpful.)

We saw a modest 5% increase in data collected, 108 participants contributed data on 697 US-based risk positions. (As noted previously, Canada was treated separately this year.)

We had great response levels from manages who participated in the optional Q&A portion. That generated another wave of fascinating feedback and response, coming in at 20+ pages of commentary, which is presented in the report, grouped by firm size bands, addressing six questions:

1. 1. What are your top challenges tied to risk staff recruiting, training, and career development?
   2. What are your goals for risk staff recruiting, training, and career development in 2025?
   3. To what extent are you adding new/emerging roles to your risk organization (e.g. OCG, AI related)? If new roles aren’t yet defined or funded, which would you like to add if possible?
   4. Are there staffing model changes you’re pursuing or would like to pursue moving forward?
   5. What is your firm’s remote work strategy for risk? What challenges/opportunities, if any, does remote work present for your firm and its staffing strategy?
   6. What risk initiatives, if any, is your firm focusing fresh investment in new staff, new resources for 2026?

For those who participated, I expect to have PDFs in your inboxes by the end of the day. Depending on your participation:

• Managers who contributed team data and participated in the Q&A will receive the “extended edition” of the report, coming in at 43 pages, which includes peer Q&A responses
• Managers who contributed team data only will receive the “standard edition” of the report, which includes complete data on all positions and compensation data included in the extended version (20 pages).
• Individual contributors who shared their personal details, will receive a personal benchmark compensation summary relevant to their specific role and firm demographics.

If you/your law firm did not participate in the survey, we’re making copies or personalized benchmarks available for a fee. Please get in touch for details. 

I’d like to thank everyone who participated. I hope the results and analysis provide fresh insight and support to those looking for greater clarity on industry compensation practices and trends.

Thoughts are brewing for 2026…

Thanks!

“Litigation Funding’s Influence on Cases Warrants Disclosure Rule” —

• “Third-party litigation funding, or TPLF, is a multibillion dollar industry of financing lawsuits in exchange for a cut of any judgment or settlement. Leaders of these businesses have disavowed any control over the cases they finance.”
• “But a recent analysis of their own contracts reveals that funders have significant control over their clients’ litigation, despite their claims to the contrary. To ensure fairness in the legal system, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules should adopt a rule requiring disclosure of TPLF contracts.”
• “An executive of Burford Capital, the world’s largest litigation funder, in 2022 told an audience of judges, ‘I don’t know how to say this any more clearly; we don’t control settlement. If we do … I would find it really loathsome to misrepresent that to a court.'”
• “At around that time, Burford was seeking to enforce its contractual rights to prevent its client, Sysco Corp., from consummating a settlement agreement in a lawsuit that Burford had funded.”
• “A new analysis based on the limited number of TPLF contracts that have become public shows that such contracts give non-party funders specific mechanisms of control or significant influence over litigation, including the authority to reject settlement terms if funders don’t find their return satisfactory.”
• “The potency of these hidden control mechanisms may be ‘rather amazing’—as the US Bankruptcy Court of the Northern District of Texas found in In re Fresh Acquisitions, LLC—given funders’ disavowals of control. Generally, courts and litigants have no awareness of such provisions because the funding contracts typically prohibit the plaintiff and counsel from divulging the agreement’s existence or discussing its terms.”
• “Control by non-party funders matters, because our litigation system is set up to enable parties and their lawyers to resolve disputes based on facts (rather than speculation) with the aid of the court.”
• “When non-parties dictate or influence crucial decisions such as going to trial, settling, and replacing counsel, it can have a profound or disruptive effect on the litigation. At a minimum, it prevents parties who are unaware of the funding agreements from making a full and fair appraisal of their case—an ability that is fundamental to our legal system.”
• “Some TPLF contracts expressly give non-party funders complete control over the litigation. Others ensure that funders have indirect (but still powerful) influence by requiring the funded plaintiffs and lawyers to pursue the claims and maximize proceeds, and by allowing funders to stop the cash flow at any time.”
• “TPLF contracts also may give funders remarkable influence over plaintiffs’ counsel, including the selection and replacement of counsel. Some extend this influence further by obligating the plaintiff to take directions from counsel.”
• “Provisions of TPLF contracts can shape outcomes and undermine court orders, such as by requiring the plaintiff to pay the funder the monetary value of any injunctive relief or specific performance awarded. This is a strong incentive against non-monetary relief that can skew the remedies presented to, and ultimately ordered by, the court.”
• “Some TPLF contracts require that the plaintiff and counsel provide all documents obtained in the course of litigation to the funders, a provision likely inconsistent with most protective orders, and which may even risk improper dissemination of intellectual property.”
• “As more disputes over TPLF contracts come to light, judges are increasingly recognizing the need to know whether non-parties have control over the named parties’ litigation decisions and the ability to influence key decisions in the litigation.”
• “All courts should understand that when funders are participating in litigation, their involvement and agreements should be disclosed just like all other participants in public litigation, who must identify themselves openly with very limited exceptions.”
• “The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require companies to disclose their insurance agreements so that ‘counsel for both sides to make the same realistic appraisal of the case.’ Courts routinely insist that the insurer’s decision-makers participate in key events in the litigation, including pre-trial and settlement conferences.”
• “Last year, a letter signed by more than 100 companies representing the technology, financial services, health care, transportation and telecommunications industries called for a rule requiring TPLF investors to disclose their contracts.”

“Minister ‘very hesitant’ on third-party funding” —

• “The Minister for Justice has said that he has concerns about the introduction of third-party litigation funding in Ireland.”
• “Jim O’Callaghan was speaking at a conference on dispute resolution organised by business-law firm Mason Hayes & Curran (MHC).”
• “The law in Ireland currently prohibits the funding of legal cases by outside parties who do not have a legitimate and independent interest in the dispute, subject to the certain exceptions. The Law Reform Commission (LRC) is looking at the issue and is expected to publish a report by the end of this year.”
• “Minister O’Callaghan told the MHC event that, while third-party funding offered potential access-to-justice benefits, there was a risk of ‘commodifying justice’.”
• “He said that he could not ignore the experiences of other countries that provided proof that the ‘big winners’ from third-party litigation funding were lawyers.”
• “‘I have no interest, in my role as Minister for Justice, in enriching lawyers’, he said, adding that members of the profession could do that themselves by doing a good job and getting paid fairly.”
• “The minister said that, while he would wait for the LRC report and consider it closely, ‘ultimately, I’m very hesitant about it’.”
• “In a panel discussion on third-party funding, barrister Emily Egan McGrath SC said that the Irish courts had shown ‘increasing frustration’ about the lack of legislative reform in the area, and had shown a tendency to expand existing exceptions.”
• “She cited the case of Campbell v O’Doherty [Trading as The Irish Light], where the High Court rejected a challenge to the proceedings based on the fact that the plaintiff benefited from crowdfunding.”
• “The barrister told the event that the judgment, however, did not engage with the wider issues raised by crowdfunding, such as whether funders could be liable for costs.”
• “MHC partner Colin Monaghan said that there was now ‘more nervousness’ in Britain, where there had been less regulation in the area, about how the litigation-funding industry had developed.”
• “The panel also discussed other issues raised by third-party funding, such as whether advice given to clients should also be given to funders.”
• “MHC partner Rory Kirrane SC told the event that conflicts over the spoils of litigation had led to what he described as an ‘unedifying’ sub-class of litigation between plaintiffs and funders emerging.”
• “He said that this was ‘an evil that needed to be guarded against’ in any proposed changes.”
• “Asked about who should regulate any reformed third-party-funding regime, there was broad agreement among the panel that one of the existing regulatory bodies, such as the Central Bank or CCPC, would make more sense than setting up a new watchdog.”
• “The former chief justice, who is president of the LRC, concluded that the area was ‘a gap that needed to be filled’, but added that it needed to be regulated to genuinely contribute to access to justice.”

“Pfizer, other drugmakers ask court to bar ex-prosecutor from price-fixing lawsuits” —

• “A former government antitrust enforcer who oversaw price-fixing cases for U.S. states against major generic drugmakers should be barred from working on similar matters at his private law firm, a group of pharmaceutical companies told a federal judge on Wednesday [9/10].”
• In filings in federal court in Philadelphia, Pfizer, Teva, Mylan and several other drugmakers said that the lawyer, Joseph Nielsen, a former assistant Connecticut state attorney general, and his law firm should be disqualified from representing insurers Molina and Humana in ongoing antitrust litigation.”
• “The companies claimed that Nielsen, who had worked for Connecticut for nearly 20 years until July, acquired confidential information while overseeing drug-price litigation for the state against dozens of drug manufacturers.”
• “The Lowey firm told the defendants that Nielsen would not share confidential information gained from past settlement negotiations and that there were no restrictions on his representation of Molina and Humana, the drugmakers said in their court filings.”
• “Nielsen’s participation in the lawsuit runs afoul of rules restricting the work of government lawyers who enter private practice, the drugmakers alleged. ‘He undoubtedly has unique insight into how defendants assess the merits, value the claims, approach settlement negotiations, and is able or unable to satisfy any judgment or settlement demand,’ according to the drugmakers. ‘He cannot unlearn any of that.'”
• “Nielsen began representing Molina and Humana in July as a newly-named partner at Lowey. The firm markets its work for major insurers seeking damages for alleged overcharges for prescription drugs.”
• “The push to disqualify Nielsen and his firm comes after Humana’s lawsuit was selected last week by U.S. District Judge Cynthia Rufe in Philadelphia as a bellwether case to test claims against the drugmakers, and was set for trial in September 2026.”

“Fla. Judge’s DQ Not Required Over Prior Sheriff’s Office Work” —

• “A Florida state judge who previously worked for a sheriff’s office is not required to disqualify themself from a criminal case in which sheriff’s deputies are witnesses, according to an opinion published by the Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee.”
• “The committee responded to a judge asking if their previous role as chief legal counsel for a sheriff’s department called for disqualification in a case they were presiding over in which sheriff’s deputies are appearing as investigative witnesses. In an opinion from Sept. 12 titled JEAC Opinion 2025-15, the committee found the judge did not.”
• “In that role, they represented the sheriff in civil matters such as asset forfeitures, risk protection orders, public records disputes, small claims matters, civil liability matters, and policy and procedure advisement. Additionally, the judge was primarily involved in the administrative operations of the sheriff’s office rather than as a witness or investigator in active criminal investigations.”
• “‘The inquiring judge’s role was not to represent deputy sheriffs in their individual capacity, but rather the sheriff in his official capacity when the sheriff was a party to a civil case or controversy,’ the opinion said.”
• “Judges in Florida must disqualify themselves under the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct if their impartiality might reasonably be questioned, according to the opinion.”
• “The committee referenced another opinion from 2021 on a similar subject matter. That opinion, named 2021-18, considered whether a judge served as a lawyer on a matter before the court and not simply the nature of the judge’s previous employment.”
• “‘But that does not appear to be the case in the current question for this committee,’ it said.”
• “The committee added that disclosure of the judge’s previous role when the sheriff’s office is an investigating entity and not a litigant is also unnecessary.”

“Update to ‘Conflict U.’: Some Judges Are Recusing Due to a University Conflict” —

• “In July, Fix the Court released a report called “Conflict U.” that identified 24 federal judges who did not recuse in six dozen cases involving the universities where they also serve as law school instructors. This practice raises clear conflict-of-interest concerns, despite being sanctioned by judiciary policy.”
• “This past month, Fix the Court conducted follow-up research on this issue, and what we found was somewhat surprising: several judges with adjunct positions at law schools are, in fact, choosing to recuse when the law schools’ parent universities find themselves in their courtrooms. And at least one judge (we have another in mind but are double-checking) is recusing due a spousal connection to a university. N.B.: the Buescher and Koeltl examples were included in ‘Conflict U.,’ though the others were not.”
• “1. In June, D. Neb. Judge Brian Buescher recused in Mohammed v. Creighton University (filed 12/9/24; last filing 6/3/25; recusal order entered 6/2/25) likely because he serves as an instructor at Creighton University School of Law.”
• “2. In May, N.D. Ga. Magistrate Judge Anna Howard recused in Manuel v. Georgia State University (filed 5/5/25; last filing 6/16/25; recusal order entered 5/6/25). According to her LinkedIn profile (she’s a 2025 appointee, and her initial financial disclosure isn’t yet posted in the online database), Howard teaches at the University of Georgia School of Law, which, alongside Georgia State, is part of the University System of Georgia.”
• “3. In April, D. Mass. Judge William G. Young recused in Curtin-Wilding v. Trustees of Boston University (filed 2/21/25, last filing 8/27/25; recusal order entered 4/29/25). We believe the recusal occurred due to Young’s prior teaching at BU Law, from 1979 to 2020, which is mentioned in the defendant’s motion for recusal.”
• “4. In April, S.D.N.Y. Judge John Koeltl recused in Thomas v. New York University (filed 3/26/25; last filing 6/20/25; recusal order entered 4/1/25 [text-only in the docket]) likely because he serves as an adjunct at NYU School of Law.”

“Judge agrees to recusal in Oregon National Guard lawsuit after Trump Justice Department complaint” —

• “The federal judge overseeing a lawsuit to block the deployment of Oregon National Guard troops to Portland agreed Thursday to recuse himself after attorneys for the U.S. Department of Justice questioned his ability to appear impartial.”
• “U.S. District Court Judge Michael Simon’s spouse, Rep. Suzanne Bonamici, is a Democrat in Congress. Attorneys for the government argued in a court filing submitted Thursday that Bonamici has pushed back against President Donald Trump’s decision to federalize 200 Oregon National Guard troops to guard federal property in Portland, including the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Building south of downtown.”
• “‘To be sure, Defendants recognize that Judge Simon and Representative Bonamici speak for themselves, not for each other,’ the Justice Department filing stated. ‘Nonetheless, the unique factual, legal, and political role that Judge Simon’s spouse has played in the central events of this lawsuit may create the appearance of partiality.'”
• “In response, Simon issued a brief order stating he ‘does not believe that recusal is required under either federal law’ or a code of conduct for federal judges. Simon said ‘because it is necessary that the focus of this lawsuit remain on the critically important constitutional and statutory issues presented by the parties’ he would step aside. The judge noted the Justice Department raised the issue three days after an initial hearing and less than 24 hours before a hearing Friday on a restraining order to block the deployment.”

“Known Risk, No Coverage: Prior Knowledge Exclusion Applies Based on Probate Allegations” —

• “The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, applying New Jersey law, has held that a prior knowledge exclusion barred coverage for a legal malpractice claim arising from a probate dispute because a reasonable attorney would have believed that the lawyer breached a professional duty or otherwise foreseen the potential for liability. Ascot Specialty Ins. Co. v. Mason, Griffin & Pierson, P.C., 2025 WL 2388433 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2025).”
• “In December 2020, the estate of a deceased client filed a probate action alleging that a lawyer assisted the deceased client’s wife in the misappropriation of estate assets. A few months later, the lawyer’s firm purchased a professional liability policy. The policy contained a prior knowledge exclusion, which barred coverage if, prior to the inception of the policy, an ‘Insured has any basis (1) to believe that any Insured breached a professional duty; or (2) to foresee that any such Wrongful Act or Related Circumstances might reasonably be expected to be the basis of a Claim against any Insured.'”
• “In January 2023, the estate filed a lawsuit alleging that the insured lawyer committed legal malpractice by ‘knowingly,’ ‘intentionally,’ or ‘negligently’ assisting in the tortious misappropriation of estate assets. The insurer denied coverage for the malpractice action under the prior knowledge exclusion.”
• “The court found that the probate action sought to disqualify the lawyer for conflicts of interest and his ‘knowing and intentional facilitation of’ tortious transfers. The court determined that those allegations alone demonstrated that a ‘reasonable attorney’ would either (1) believe that the lawyer breached a professional duty by allegedly assisting in the tortious transfer of estate assets; or (2) foresee that the lawyer’s alleged actions might reasonably be expected to be the basis of a future claim against any insured.”
• “The court noted that the malpractice action contained similar allegations as the probate action, further demonstrating that the insureds should have foreseen a legal malpractice claim against them. As such, the court held that the prior knowledge exclusion barred coverage for the malpractice action.”

“Civil Action No. 21-cv-02681-RM-NRN” —

• “During discovery, Plaintiffs sought to depose four of Defendant’s former employees who held managerial positions during the relevant period: Kierra Howlett, Kristi Adkins, Eric Girard, and Kevin Copeland. Seyfarth reached out to these individuals, agreed to represent them at their depositions, and entered engagement agreements with them. Defendant paid for the representation.”
• “Seyfarth proceeded to represent Howlett, Adkins, and Copeland at their depositions; Girard’s scheduled deposition has been stayed. Seyfarth terminated its representation of Howlett, Adkins, and Girard after learning that they previously worked for Defendant in hourly positions during the relevant period. It has not terminated its representation of Copeland, as he was never an hourly employee. In the current Motion, Plaintiffs assert that Seyfarth violated ethical rules by soliciting and representing Defendant’s former employees, some of whom are potential class members, and therefore Seyfarth should be disqualified and Defendant sanctioned.”
• “Plaintiffs argue that Seyfarth violated the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct because Girard and Howlett ‘are confirmed members of the putative class’ and Adkins ‘may also be a class member.’ (ECF No. 91 at 3.) They also argue it was improper for Seyfarth to solicit the four former employees and for Defendant to pay for the representation.”
• “In response, Defendant contends that Seyfarth was unaware that any of these former employees were potential class members when it agreed to represent them in connection with their depositions, and that it terminated its representation of Howlett, Adkins, and Girard upon learning that they worked in hourly positions during the relevant period.”
• “Defendant also contends that Copeland is not a potential class member because he was never an hourly employee.Assuming Plaintiffs—who have never been clients of Seyfarth—have standing to seek disqualification under the present circumstances… the Court finds their allegations are insufficient to establish that the limited representation here adversely affected the integrity of the judicial process, much less that any such impact outweighs Defendant’s right to counsel of its choice.”
• “First, citing Colo. RPC 1.7, Plaintiffs argue that Seyfarth’s representation of Howlett and Girard created a conflict of interest. But that Rule applies to representation involving ‘a concurrent conflict of interest.’ Here, neither individual is a party to this litigation as the case now stands… and Seyfarth withdrew its representation of both individuals once a potential conflict came to light.”
• “In the absence of a certified class, the Court is not persuaded these potential class members had any interest that was directly adverse to Defendant’s interests in this litigation. And, in the absence of even a motion for class certification, Plaintiffs’ suggestion that Seyfarth would need to be ‘actively fighting class certification’ (ECF No. 91 at 9) is premature.”
• “Nor has Plaintiff shown a significant risk that Seyfarth’s brief representation of these witnesses was limited in any way by its responsibilities to Defendant, much less that it was ‘materially limited’ as to run afoul of Rule 1.7(a)(2). Second, even if a concurrent conflict of interest existed at the time of Seyfarth’s representation, Plaintiffs have not shown that the requirements of Rule 1.7(b) were not satisfied. Plaintiffs have not shown that Seyfarth had any reason to believe it could not provide competent and diligent representation to these individuals.”
• “The representation was not prohibited by law. And, although Howlett expressed interest in becoming a class member and receiving compensation if Plaintiffs’ case is successful, that does not mean she was asserting a claim against Defendant at the time of the representation.”
• “Moreover, Howlett and Girard gave their informed consent to the representation in their engagement agreements. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument, that consent is not negated in Howlett’s case by her tentative and somewhat ambiguous deposition testimony about conflicts of interest generally. Under the circumstances, the Court is not persuaded that Seyfarth’s last-minute discovery of potential conflicts demonstrates that it lacked reasonable procedures to determine whether conflicts exist or that it should have anticipated that these witnesses could qualify as class members.”
• “Accordingly, the Court declines to disqualify Seyfarth because of any concurrent conflict of interest. Third, Plaintiffs’ reliance on Colo. RPC 1.9, which governs a lawyer’s duty to former clients, is also misplaced here.”
• “Because no class has been certified, the Court cannot conclude that these individuals’ interests are ‘materially adverse’ to Defendant’s interests. And, as discussed above, these individuals gave their informed consent to being represented simultaneously with Defendant. See id. Nor have Plaintiffs shown that by conducting pre-disposition meetings with these individuals, Seyfarth obtained confidential information that Defendant might use to their disadvantage.”
• “Thus, Plaintiffs have not established that Seyfarth violated any duty it owed to its former clients or that any potential conflict of interest tainted the fairness of these proceedings.
• “Fourth, Plaintiffs also contend that Seyfarth’s representation of the former employees violates Rules 1.8(f) and 3.4(b) because Defendant paid for the representation. But again, Plaintiffs have not shown that the consent these individuals provided is invalid.Plaintiffs also have not shown that there was any interference with counsel’s professional judgment or any client-lawyer relationship.”
• “Plaintiffs’ suggestion that Defendant paid for the representation for the purpose of influencing anyone’s testimony is unsubstantiated. There is no indication, for example, that these witnesses were induced to give testimony favorable to Defendant as part of quid pro quo arrangement.
• “Finally, Plaintiffs have not shown that Seyfarth engaged in inappropriate solicitation of clients. Seyfarth apparently reached out to the former employees to advance discovery in this case, but there is no indication that it was motivated by pecuniary gain. Like Plaintiffs’ other arguments, this one is speculative and lacks factual support.
• “Aside from failing to establish an ethical violation by Seyfarth, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated they have been prejudiced in any way by the testimony provided by these potential class members. In the absence of any showing that Defendant or Seyfarth violated ethical rules, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ request to have these witnesses or their testimony stricken as a sanction is unavailing. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion (ECF No. 91) is DENIED.”

“Husband of judge who blocked ‘Alligator Alcatraz’ shutdown has ties to DeSantis” —

• “An appeals court judge who blocked the closure of Ron DeSantis’s controversial ‘Alligator Alcatraz’ immigration jail is married to a powerful conservative attorney whose law firm has raked in millions of dollars from the Republican Florida governor’s administration, it has been revealed.”
• “Barbara Lagoa authored the 11th circuit court of appeal’s 2-1 ruling last month that paused the Miami district judge Kathleen Williams’s earlier order that the harsh detention facility in the Florida Everglades must be wound down within 60 days.”
• “Lagoa is married to Paul Huck, a senior figure in Tallahassee-based Lawson Huck Gonzalez that is ‘one of Florida’s most politically connected conservative law firms’, according to Prism, an online news outlet that first reported the news.”
• “The law firm, founded in 2023, is tightly aligned to DeSantis’s far-right agenda and has secured more than $10m in state contracts since, WUSF reported. It represents the DeSantis administration in a lawsuit against the retailer Target over its 2023 Pride campaign and was recently hired to assist the search for a new president at the University of West Florida, where DeSantis is engineering a ‘hostile takeover’ of the formerly liberal college.”
• “Prism said it was ‘not apparent’ that Huck or his firm had a financial interest in any matter related to ‘Alligator Alcatraz’, the state-run remote tented camp for undocumented migrants that has been criticized for its harsh conditions and treatment of detainees.”
• “But immigration advocates and Florida Democrats say the fact that Lagoa is making rulings in favor of the DeSantis administration while her husband is benefiting financially from it is a massive conflict of interest and grounds for her recusal.”
• “Anna Eskamani, a Democratic state representative, said Lagoa’s refusal to recuse herself ‘further erodes people’s trust in the judiciary’.”
• “In a statement, she said: ‘It’s concerning to have on such an important case with huge ramifications for the environment a judge with that power to decide on this matter, with a husband that is working on high-profile political cases on behalf of DeSantis.'”
• “The Guardian has contacted Lagoa and Lawson Huck Gonzalez for comment.”
• “In a statement to Prism, Lagoa’s office pointed to judicial ethics rules that require recusal ‘if a judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, has previously served as a lawyer or government official in the matter, has a financial interest in the outcome, or if the judge’s spouse or close family member has such an interest or role’.”

“County’s Pharmacy Chief Also Works at a Law Firm” —

• “The county of San Diego’s chief pharmacy officer, who collects a $232,419 yearly salary, moonlights as a partner at a New York-based law firm that advises pharmaceutical companies. County officials refused Voice of San Diego’s request for disclosure documents that county staff must submit about outside work or other activities that may conflict with their county duties.”
• “Dr. Emily Do is the county’s full-time chief pharmacy officer, who oversees county pharmacy practices and standards and has been in that role since 2019. In April, she joined the law firm Dilworth & Barrese as a partner and patent attorney, according to her LinkedIn profile. The firm’s website lists Do as a partner and member of its West Coast team based in San Diego. The firm also notes that it ‘serves as counsel for leading companies in the pharmaceutical industry’ but doesn’t identify specific ones.”
• “‘Emily Do is a registered patent attorney and works with independent inventors, healthcare and pharmaceutical companies to protect their intellectual property interests in the United States and abroad,’ her Dilworth & Barrese bio reads. The law firm bio doesn’t mention that Do is also San Diego County’s chief pharmacy officer – or specific companies she has advised.”
• “Per a 2018 county job description, the chief pharmacy officer works with county Health and Human Services officials, including pharmacy staff, to implement pharmacy policies and standards, recommend changes to county pharmacy services ‘based on community need’ and ensure the county is following regulations. ”
  “In a more recent statement seeking to become the next president of the California Society of Health-System Pharmacists, Do wrote that her county role has also involved advocacy for legislation such Senate Bill 872, which in 2022 allowed counties to operate mobile pharmacies to provide medications and vaccines to homeless residents and others. Do is now set to become the state society’s next president. ”
  “County officials have decided Do’s legal work doesn’t present a conflict. ‘Providing records regarding an employee’s activities outside of work, which has not been deemed to constitute a conflict, would impede on an individual’s personal life and right to privacy,’ the county wrote in its Monday response denying Voice’s records request. ‘Therefore, withholding these documents clearly outweighs the public interest in the disclosure of these records.'”
• “County spokesperson Tim McClain wrote in a separate statement that that ‘based on the information provided by Dr. Do as required by county policy, no incompatible activities were identified.’ “
• “Do has for years juggled both pharmaceutical and legal work. At the time the county hired Do, her LinkedIn page indicates that she was practicing intellectual property law as a sole proprietor though she didn’t report any related income in state-mandated economic disclosures for 2019. Her disclosures only mention volunteer legal work for two local organizations.”
• “Do’s latest disclosure, filed in March for 2024, does not include income or details on her work as a partner at Dilworth & Barrese. “
• “The county this week denied Voice of San Diego’s state Public Records Act request for county forms that Do may have submitted reporting her outside employment. In those forms, county officials are charged with reporting outside activities or jobs they are paid for and their duties so the county can decide whether that work is incompatible with their county job.”

“[IN CHAMBERS] Order Regarding Motions to Disqualify [90,187]” —

• “Schulte is a multi-national law firm that, as discussed below, has represented Politan, Masimo, and RTW Clients in various capacities… Adriana Schwartz (‘Schwartz’) is the Schulte partner who primarily advised RTW Clients. Swartz is a former litigation partner at Schulte who represented Politan and later Masimo. Swartz is now a partner at Quinn Emanuel, another multi- national law firm, which has assumed representation of Masimo in this action.”
• “In November 2021, RTW Clients retained Schulte to advise them on regulatory and securities matters related to investment, including Sections 13 and 16 of the Exchange Act. Their Engagement Letter included an advance waiver of conflicts of interest permitting Schulte to represent clients ‘directly adverse’ to RTW Clients, including ‘on opposite sides of a litigation or proceeding.’ Schwartz was the Schulte attorney ‘primarily responsible for the RTW account.'”
• “Shortly before Schulte’s representation of RTW Clients, Swartz and Schulte were engaged by Politan in July 2021. Schulte and Swartz subsequently represented Politan in its proxy contest to elect new board members on Masimo’s board in 2024. This included suing Kiani in the Delaware Court of Chancery and issuing a third-party subpoena on RTW Clients.”
• “On July 3rd of the same year as Schulte’s representation of Politan in the proxy contest, Senior Counsel for RTW Clients, Alice Lee, called Schwartz for advice related to RTW Clients’ investment holdings and empty voting. When Lee disclosed that her questions were in relation to the Masimo proxy contest, Schwartz informed Lee that she could not provide advice related to Masimo due to a conflict at the firm.”
• “Despite knowledge of a potential conflict, Schulte did not erect an ethical wall around Schwartz until August 27, 2024, when Swartz conducted a conflicts check before filing a third-party subpoena on RTW Clients. As lead partner for the Politan matter, Swartz was then barred from receiving information related to RTW Clients or discussing anything related to Politan, Masimo, or RTW Clients with Schwartz or other attorneys on the RTW Clients advisory matter.”
• “After Politan’s successful proxy battle, Masimo engaged Swartz and Schulte to represent it in this action filed against RTW Defendants in October 2024 in the Southern District of New York (‘SDNY’). Schulte refused RTW Client’s request to voluntarily withdraw.”
• “In March 2025, Swartz left Schulte to join Quinn Emanuel. Shortly thereafter, Masimo signed an engagement letter with Quinn Emanuel to represent it in this action on April 7, 2025. After the action was transferred to this Court, all of the remaining Schulte attorneys gave notice that they would not be appearing for Masimo. Only Quinn Emanuel attorneys remain in the action and Swartz is the only former Schulte attorney who has appeared for Masimo since transfer.”
• “The crux of this Motion is Swartz’s alleged conflict of interest as lead attorney for Masimo. Although Swartz has left Schulte for Quinn Emanuel, he may nonetheless be subject to disqualification for his prior association with Schulte under a concurrent representation analysis. No determination is necessary, however, if RTW Clients effectively waived their right to move for disqualification under the Engagement Letter with Schulte. Any advance waiver would necessarily include the future activities of the firm and its partners, including Swartz.”
• “However, advance waiver for concurrent representation conflicts that might arise in the future may be effective when a client ‘reasonably understands risks that the waiver entails.'”
• “Here, there is no doubt that RTW Clients, a hedge fund manager and its affiliates, are sophisticated users of the investment advisory services it sought from Schulte and multiple other law firms.  The Engagement Letter was extensively negotiated by in-house counsel capable of advising RTW Clients of the risks of signing the waiver. RTW Clients even identified and required the inclusion of specific parties that Schulte would not represent without prior written consent.”
• “Engagement Letter also informed RTW Clients of the conflicts that they were agreeing to waive, including the situation here. The Engagement Letter states that Schulte ‘would not be disqualified . . . from representing another client in a litigation or other proceeding that is adverse to you as long as the Firm is not then representing you in that matter.’ The crux of the issue that parties dispute is whether Schulte’s representation of Masimo against RTW Defendants constitutes the same ‘matter’ as legal services provided to RTW Defendants under the Engagement Letter.”
• “RTW Clients seek to construe ‘matter’ under the advance waiver of conflicts as the ‘Matter’ as defined on page one of the Engagement Letter: ‘to represent and advise . . . in connection with general investment advice, securities law and related matters.'”
• “The Court agrees with Masimo that this broad interpretation of ‘matter’ under the advance waiver would lead to an absurd result by rendering the waiver virtually useless, preventing representation against RTW Clients, a hedge fund manager, for any matter related to a topic of ‘general investment advice.'”
• “See e.g., Saffire Corp. v. Newkidco, LLC, 286 F. Supp. 2d 302, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (‘Under traditional contract interpretation rules, a provision may not be interpreted in a manner which would render it an absurdity.’) Further, had the parties intended for this meaning of ‘matter’ to apply, they would have used the defined term ‘Matter’ from the Engagement Letter, which they did not. (Engagement Letter at 4.)”
• “In the Engagement Letter, Schulte also agreed to ‘adhere[] to its professional obligation not to disclose any confidential information or to use it for another party’s benefit.’ To the extent any confidential information was disclosed in the phone call or through general representation between Lee and Schwartz, Schwartz has attested that she did not reveal any relevant information about RTW Clients to any litigators representing Masimo at the firm.”
• “As a sophisticated user of legal services, RTW Clients understood well the risks of signing an advance waiver. So long as Schulte did not represent an adverse party in a matter in which they represented RTW Clients and did not use RTW Clients’ confidential information against them, the advance waiver forfeited RTW Clients’ right to assert Schulte’s representation of them ‘as a basis for disqualifying the Firm from representing another client of the Firm in any such other matter.’ Because Schulte did neither, the Court finds the advance waiver in the Engagement Letter effective under New York law, constituting the informed, written consent necessary under Rule 1.7.”
• “Swartz’s activity was necessarily covered under the terms of the advance waiver as a partner at Schulte. Swartz’s conduct was therefore non-disqualifiable under the same analysis completed for Schulte, and does not become disqualifiable simply because he has left the firm and joined Quinn Emanuel during the course of this litigation.”
• “As noted above, all attorneys actively associated with Schulte have withdrawn from this action. However, to the extent that Schulte might remain informally involved in this litigation, the Court finds that the foregoing advance waiver analysis applied to Swartz as a partner also applies to Schulte as a firm. Accordingly, the Court DENIES RTW Defendants’ motion to disqualify Schulte.”
• “Because the Court finds that Swartz has no disqualifiable conflict, there is no conflict to impute to Quinn Emanuel. The Court therefore DENIES RTW Defendants’ motion to disqualify Quinn Emanuel.”

“If Big Law Works on Trump’s Tariffs, Congress Should Pay For It” —

• “As part of their settlements with the Trump administration, several leading law firms reportedly have given free legal services to the Commerce Department.”
• “An important statute called the Anti-Deficiency Act generally requires that some existing appropriation—meaning a statute allowing Treasury expenditures—support any government contract or commitment of funds.”
• “Congress enacted the ADA in 1870 to stop such overspending. In its original form, the law forbid agencies from exceeding their appropriations or entering contracts without an appropriation to pay the resulting costs. But agencies still sometimes got around appropriations limits by having personnel work extra hours for free, hoping Congress would later pay them retroactively.”
• “In 1884, Congress added a provision forbidding such acceptance of ‘voluntary services’ except (in the current statutory formulation) ‘for emergencies involving the safety of human life or the protection of property.'”
• “Because agencies can’t incur spending obligations without a supporting appropriation, they can’t commit to paying employees’ wages until Congress appropriates new funds. And because agencies also can’t accept ‘voluntary services’ from employees hoping to later get paid, those employees can’t work at all for the government unless they fall within the exception for functions (like air traffic control and some law enforcement) that protect lives and property.”
• “How do these principles apply to the law firms? The administration and the firms will probably claim that the firms aren’t providing ‘voluntary services’ in the sense proscribed by the ADA because they aren’t hoping to get paid later. In fact, they may well have signed waivers disclaiming any such hope of future remuneration.”
• “Yet this theory may be a stretch in this context. For one thing, the firms are probably hoping to curry favor with the administration by providing so much work. For another, they hardly pledged these services gratuitously of their own free will in the way that a true unpaid volunteer normally would. On the contrary, the firms appear to be doing free work only because the administration took or threatened adverse actions against them such as revoking lawyers’ security clearances or seeking penalties for alleged civil rights violations due to DEI hiring.”
• “Regardless, the administration’s legal creativity in inducing free services from top-flight firms is a significant threat to congressional power. Congress creates federal agencies, such as the Commerce Department, and defines their budgets. It typically budgets for just one year at a time so that it can keep tabs on what agencies are doing and make any desired changes in the next annual appropriations cycle. It also calibrates the level of resources available for different agencies and functions. Congress determines in effect what laws will be vigorously enforced and which ones will be lower priorities or even not enforced at all.”
• “It’s also true that foreign affairs is an area of special presidential authority and that the services to the Commerce Department seem to have been related to negotiation of tariff deals. But while presidents have sometimes employed private parties voluntarily as diplomatic envoys, such envoys served of their own free will. In any event, demanding free legal work from the country’s top law firms is a far cry from the sort of control over diplomatic communications that presidents have previously claimed.”
• “This administration has sought in many ways to establish greater executive control over government spending. The law firm deals fit this pattern, and they may be a tempting example for future presidents: If budget deficits necessitate government austerity in the years ahead, presidents may find themselves looking for ways to accomplish their goals with private help instead.”